Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [128]
Headlines screamed, the public was affronted. The Daily Mirror asked on February 14: “Is it any longer true that we trust the Prime Minister, but do not trust his Government?” The News Chronicle likewise: “Have we not been hypnotised by Mr. Churchill’s personality … into acquiescence in an inefficient war direction?” The Daily Mail wrote that there were two Churchills, “1. The Inspirer of the Nation. 2. The Controller of the War.” The British people were perplexed by the second Churchill, who claimed “that it was the duty of Parliament and Press to maintain the Government with the implication that any weakening of his own position would be a weakening of its cause.” The Mail rejected this view: “No man is indispensable.” Sir William Beveridge wrote a major article for the Times, urging the creation of a “proper” War Cabinet of ministers without portfolios. A Glasgow secretary, Pam Ashford, wrote on March 5: “Defeatism is in the air, and … I feel it too.”460 When Mass Observation quizzed its observers about the prime minister, the opinion-monitoring group was startled by the vehemence of criticism. A London clerk said: “I think it is time he went461. After all, the only connection in which one thinks of Churchill now is with regard to high strategy, whatever that may be. High strategy stinks to high heaven … This view I have confirmed with quite a few people. His speeches are no longer listened to.”
While this attitude was untypically strident, there was a yearning at every level of British society for a defence supremo who could deliver battlefield success, as the prime minister seemed unable to do. Many people sought a new deliverer, an aspiration no less strongly felt because it was unrealistic and unsupported by identification of an appropriate candidate. There was no appetite to change national leaders, but much enthusiasm for delegating Churchill’s military powers. The prime minister said to his old friend Violet Bonham Carter: “I’m fed up … I feel very biteful462 and spiteful when people attack me.” He was constantly urged to add talent to his Cabinet, “but where is the galaxy? I can’t get the victories. It’s the victories that are so hard to get.”
On February 15, Singapore surrendered. This time there was no Dunkirk, no miraculous escape for the garrison. Almost thrice as many imperial troops fell into captivity as in France in 1940. Jock Colville, temporarily removed from Downing Street to train in South Africa as a fighter pilot, heard Churchill’s broadcast addressing the disaster. He was deeply moved: “The nature of his words and the unaccustomed speed463 and emotion with which he spoke convinced me that he was sorely pressed by critics and opponents at home. All the majesty of his oratory was there, but also a new note of appeal, lacking the usual confidence of support … There was something about his voice and delivery which made me shiver.” The broadcast was much less well received than most of Churchill’s performances. In private, the prime minister was angry and depressed. “We have so many men in Singapore464, so many men,” he lamented. “They should have done better.” At a Pacific War Council meeting, he said of the Japanese: “They moved quicker and ate less than our men.”
He suggested to his naval aide, Capt. Richard Pim, that this might be the moment for him to surrender the premiership. Pim said: “But my God, sir, you cannot do that.”465 It is unlikely that Churchill seriously considered resignation, but his despair was real enough. What use was it for him to display a warrior’s spirit before the world if those who fought in Britain’s name then showed themselves incapable of matching