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persuasive prime minister. Churchill wrote in his memoirs that the two men thus got more business done than at conferences. This was disingenuous. What he meant, of course, was that he was free from impassioned and hostile interventions by Marshall and his colleagues. At Hyde Park, the prime minister was enchanted to be treated as “family,” though his staff sometimes overreached themselves in exploiting guest privileges. Private secretary John Martin was sternly rebuked580 by Roosevelt’s telephonist, Louise Hachmeister, when she found him ensconced in her master’s study, using the president’s direct line to Washington.

On June 20 at Hyde Park, Churchill handed Roosevelt a masterly note on strategy. Arrangements for a landing in France in September were going forward, said the prime minister. However, the British continued to oppose such an operation unless there was a realistic prospect of being able to stay. “No responsible British military authority581 has so far been able to make a plan for September 1942 which has any chance of success unless the Germans become utterly demoralised, of which there is no likelihood. Have the American staffs a plan? If so, what is it? If a plan can be found which offers a reasonable prospect of success His Majesty’s Government will cordially welcome it and will share to the full with their American comrades the risks and sacrifices … But in case no plan can be made in which any responsible authority has good confidence … what else are we going to do? Can we afford to stand idle in the Atlantic theatre during the whole of 1942?” It was in this context, urged Churchill, that a North African landing should be studied.

That evening, the president and the prime minister flew to the capital. They were together at the White House when a pink message slip was brought to Roosevelt, who passed it wordlessly to Churchill. It read: “Tobruk has surrendered, with 25,000 men taken prisoner.” Churchill was initially disbelieving. Before leaving Britain, he had signalled to Auchinleck, stressing the importance of holding the port: “Your decision to fight it out to the end most cordially endorsed. Retreat would be fatal. This is a business not only of armour but of will power. God bless you all.” Now, the prime minister telephoned Ismay in London, who confirmed the loss of Tobruk, together with 33,000 men, 2,000 vehicles, 5,000 tons of supplies and 1,400 tons of fuel. A chaotic defence, left in the hands of a newly promoted and inexperienced South African major general, had collapsed in the face of an unexpected German thrust from the southeast. The debacle was characterised by command incompetence, a pitiful indolence and lack of initiative among many units. Maj. Gen. Hendrik Klopper’s last signal from Tobruk was an enigmatic study in despair: “Situation shambles … Am doing the worst. Petrol destroyed.”

The prime minister was stunned, humiliated. It seemed unbearable that such news should have come while he was a visitor, indeed a suppliant, in Washington. Roosevelt, perceiving his guest’s despondency, responded with unprecedented spontaneity, generosity and warmth. “What can we do to help?” he asked. After consultation with his Chiefs of Staff, the president briefly entertained a notion of dispatching a U.S. armoured division to fight in Egypt. On reflection, it was agreed instead to send the formation’s three hundred Sherman tanks and one hundred self-propelled guns, for British use. This reinforcement, of quality equipment, was critical to later British victory at El Alamein. Roosevelt’s gesture, which required the removal of new weapons from a U.S. combat formation, prompted the deepest and best-merited British gratitude of the war towards the president.

The U.S. historian Douglas Porch, one of the ablest chroniclers of the Mediterranean campaigns, believes that Churchill fundamentally misjudged American attitudes towards Britain’s war effort. The prime minister wanted a victory in the Middle East, to dispel U.S. scepticism about British fighting capability. Porch argues, however, that “it was Britain