Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [159]
A report of the Home Intelligence Division of the Ministry of Information declared: “Russian successes continue to provide605 an antidote to bad news from other fronts … ‘thank God for Russia’ is a frequent expression of the very deep and fervent feeling for that country which permeates wide sections of the public.” Membership in Britain’s Communist Party rose from 12,000 in June 1941 to 56,000 by the end of 1942. The British media provided no hint of the frightful cruelties through which Stalin sustained the Soviet Union’s defence, nor of the blunders and failures which characterised its war effort in 1941–42.
In informed political and military circles, there was no scintilla of the guilt about Soviet sacrifices that prevailed among the wider public. From Churchill downwards, there was an overwhelming and not unreasonable perception that whatever miseries and losses fell upon the Russian people, the policies of their own government—above all the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact—were chiefly responsible. Brooke wrote disgustedly about British aid to Russia, “We received nothing in return606 except abuse for handling the convoys inefficiently.” John Kennedy expressed bewilderment about public attitudes: “There is an extraordinary and misguided607 enthusiasm for the Russians. Stalin is more of a hero than the King or even Winston.” A naval officer, Commander Andrew Yates, wrote to a friend in America: “Little as I formerly liked him608, the man who killed a million Germans, Jo Stalin, becomes my friend for life.” However, a Ministry of Information official cautioned against exaggerated fears that popular applause for Soviet military prowess equated with a mass conversion to Communism, such as some Tory MPs perceived: “That danger will never come through admiration609 of the achievements of another country, but only through dissatisfaction with our own—dissatisfaction savage enough to cherish a revolutionary programme.”
Nonetheless, perceptions of the Red Army as braver and more willing to sacrifice than their own soldiers were a source of anger and shame among Churchill’s people, which persisted throughout the summer of 1942. The public could not be told that Stalin’s armies achieved their remarkable feats under draconian compulsion; that if Russian soldiers sometimes displayed more fortitude than British or American ones, this was chiefly because if they flinched they faced execution by their own commanders, a sanction imposed upon hundreds of thousands of Stalin’s men in the course of the war. Debate about British military inertia and failure continued to dominate the press. “Reactionary attitudes are spreading,”610 complained Communist Elizabeth Belsey. “The Spectator this week sounds much opposed to the 2nd front. What do all these people suppose Russia is to do without the 2nd Front? Continue fighting with faith instead of oil?”
Maggie Joy Blunt, a journalist of left-wing sympathies, wrote on August 7, 1942: “Why is not Mr. Churchill611, rather than his critics, standing on the plinth of the Nelson column shouting for a Second Front and demanding greater efforts from every man and woman in the country? The desire to make that effort is there. The people would respond instantly to the right word from Churchill. We have the feeling, strongly, that Powers That Be wish to see Russian might crippled before they will move a finger to help. They do not want Russia to have any say in the peace terms. Capitalist interests