Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [164]
Brooke rehearsed familiar objections. The chief of staff of the U.S. army challenged him bluntly, demanding: “Well, how are we going to win this war628? You cannot win it by defensive action.” Churchill formally presented Marshall’s proposal to the War Cabinet, which unanimously rejected it. There was little more to be said. The Americans remained deeply unhappy, but knew that they could not impose a scheme dependent almost entirely upon the sacrifice of British lives. Marshall had come to London with a brief from Roosevelt to make this final attempt to reconcile the British to an invasion of France; then, if he failed, to accept the North African plan. On July 22, the president cabled acquiescence in British rejection of an early assault on the Continent. With utmost reluctance, Marshall committed himself to what became the Torch landings of November 1942.
Now, the British were all smiles, and it was the Americans’ turn to sulk. “Gil” Winant, the ambassador, usually mild-mannered, expressed vehement objections to the North African plan. The American visitors spent a final weekend at Chequers, with the prime minister at his sunniest, then returned to Washington, nursing frustration.
For most of August, Marshall continued to agitate against Torch. From the moment Churchill first mooted the North African scheme back in December, the chief of staff of the army had been willing to indulge it only if U.S. troops could land unopposed, with Vichy French acquiescence. The Americans were fearful that, if they were obliged to launch an amphibious assault, the Germans would swiftly reinforce North Africa through Franco’s Spain, isolating any U.S. forces deployed east of the Straits of Gibraltar. It is important to emphasise that, in the late summer of 1942, the American Chiefs believed that the British were doomed to lose Egypt. This would free Rommel’s army to turn on a U.S. invasion force. Marshall not only disliked committing American soldiers to the Mediterranean theatre; he feared that a campaign there could fail. A cynic such as Alan Brooke might have contrasted unfavourably Marshall’s insouciance about the perils of an abortive British descent on France with his sensitivity about the prospect of an unsuccessful American one on North Africa.
The Torch commitment represented one of Churchill’s most important victories of the war. He had persuaded Roosevelt to impose a course of action on his Chiefs of Staff against their strongest wishes. As for the president, this was his most significant strategic intervention, one of the few occasions when he acted in earnest the part of commander-in-chief, instead of delegating his powers to his military advisers. The two national leaders displayed the highest wisdom. Roosevelt’s decision was driven by the same political imperatives that Churchill recognised. Marshall later acknowledged this, saying of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff: “We failed to see that a leader in a democracy629 has to keep the people entertained. The people demand action.” Fulfilment of this requirement was matched by the president’s acknowledgement that if the British did not choose to land in France in 1942, they could not be made to do so. At this stage, also, Roosevelt was much more ready than in subsequent years to be influenced by Churchill’s judgement. The United States would land only an initial seventy thousand men in North Africa, though thereafter these would be progressively reinforced. In 1942, a significant proportion of Marshall’s available forces were committed to home defence of the United States, though it was hard to see who might mount an invasion.
The British sought to salve bruised U.S. Army sensibilities by offering a strong endorsement of its ambitions for a landing in France in 1943. But Marshall knew that once U.S. forces were fighting in the Mediterranean, it would be hard to get them out again in time for an