Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [189]
Before the two leaders parted, they dispatched a joint cable to Moscow, outlining the conference decisions. “Whatever we decided to undertake in 1943709 would have to be represented to Stalin as something very big,” wrote Ian Jacob. The Soviet warlord was now told that there would be a landing in Europe “as soon as practicable.” Neither leader supposed, however, that their studied vagueness would fool Moscow. “Nothing in the world will be accepted by Stalin as an alternative to our placing 50 or 60 divisions in France by the spring of this year,” observed Churchill. “I think he will be disappointed and furious.” The prime minister was correct. To Marshal Georgy Zhukov, by now his most trusted commander, Stalin vented anger about the inadequacy of aid from the Western Allies: “Hundreds of thousands of Soviet people710 are giving their lives in the struggle against fascism, and Churchill is haggling with us about two dozen Hurricanes. And anyway those Hurricanes are crap—our pilots think nothing of them.”
There was one important aspect of the Casablanca conference, and indeed of Allied strategy-making for the rest of the war, which was never expressly articulated by Western leaders, and is still seldom acknowledged by historians. The Americans and British flattered themselves that they were shaping policies which would bring about the destruction of Nazism. Yet in truth, every option they considered and every operation they subsequently executed remained subordinate to the struggle on the Eastern Front. The Western Allies never became responsible for the defeat of Germany’s main armies. They merely assisted the Russians to accomplish this. For all the enthusiasm of George Marshall and his colleagues to invade Europe, it remains impossible to believe that the United States would have been any more willing than was Britain to accept millions of casualties to fulfil the attritional role of the Red Army at Stalingrad, Kursk, and in a hundred lesser bloodbaths between 1942 and 1945. The U.S. Army never attained a strength that would have enabled it to meet the main strength of the Wehrmacht in France or anywhere else, irrespective of the date chosen for D-Day. Roosevelt and Churchill enjoyed the satisfaction of occupying higher moral ground than Stalin. At Casablanca, they decided Anglo-American strategy. However, historians who claim that the president and prime minister “charted the course to victory” use grossly inflationary phrases. Stalin and his commanders did that.
Roosevelt took off for home on January 25. Churchill lingered, and in those surroundings which he loved created his only painting of the war, a view of the Atlas Mountains. Then he embarked upon one of his most energetic rounds of wartime travelling, which pleased chiefly himself. Brooke was obliged to cancel a cherished scheme for two days’ sightseeing and a Moroccan partridge shoot, to accompany his master to Turkey. The Cabinet opposed this expedition, which ministers considered futile. Churchill overruled them, hankering to revive his grand design, which had foundered in 1941, to raise the Balkans against Hitler. He also rejoiced in the exhilaration of touring the Mediterranean as a victorious warlord after the humiliations and frustrations of earlier years.
Having arrived at the Cairo embassy early on January 26, he recoiled from the ambassadress’s offer of breakfast tea, demanding instead white wine. Brooke described the scene with fastidious amazement: “A tumbler was brought711 which he drained in one go, and then licked his lips, turned to Jacqueline [Lampson] and said: ‘Ah! that is good, but you know, I have already had two whiskies and soda and 2 cigars this morning!!’ It was then only shortly after 7.30 am. We had travelled all night in poor