Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [192]
THIRTEEN
Out of the Desert
IN 1943, to Winston Churchill and to many British, Russian and American people, it sometimes seemed that the Western Allies spent more time talking than fighting Hitler’s armies. Granted, large forces of aircraft battered Germany in a bomber offensive of which much was made in newspapers and cables to Stalin. The Royal Navy, with growing strength and success, continued to wage a vital defensive struggle to hold open the Atlantic convoy routes. U.S. forces fought savage battles with the Japanese in the Pacific. But this was the last year of the war in which shortage of resources severely constrained Anglo-American ground action. In 1944, a vast array of ships, planes, weapons and equipment generated by U.S. industrial mobilisation flooded forth onto the battlefields, arming Allied forces on land, at sea and in the air on a scale such as the world had never seen. Until then, however, Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s armies engaging the Axis remained pathetically small in comparison to those of the Soviets.
The British committed thirteen divisions to North Africa, the Americans six. Of these formations, eight would land in Sicily. Some eleven British divisions in varying states of manning and with insufficient equipment remained at home, training for operations in France or wherever else the prime minister decided to commit them. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of British troops were scattered along the North African littoral, and throughout Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Persia and India. These performed logistical and garrison functions of varying degrees of utility but were not, as Churchill often reminded Alan Brooke, killing Italians, Germans or Japanese. The U.S. Marine Corps was deployed in the Pacific, while Gen. Douglas MacArthur directed a modest army contingent in Australia and New Guinea. In 1943, the latter campaign was dominated by three Australian divisions. A huge Indian army in India, supplemented by British units, pursued desultory operations, but seldom that year deployed more than six divisions against the Japanese. At a time when Stalin and Hitler were pitting millions of men against each other in the east, it is scarcely surprising that the Russians viewed their allies’ Mediterranean activities with contempt.
Most Anglo-American historians agree that a D-Day in France in 1943 would have been a disaster. It is only necessary to consider the ferocity of the resistance the Germans mounted in Normandy between June and August 1944 to imagine how much more formidable could have been their response to an invasion a year earlier, when Hitler’s power was much greater and that of the Allies much less. But it infuriated the Russians that the British and Americans exercised to the full their luxury of choice, such as Stalin lacked after June 1941, about when to engage a major German army. It is possible that the Allies might have got ashore in France in 1943, and stayed there. But the casualties of the campaign that followed would have been horrendous, dwarfing those of northwest Europe in 1944–45. While the Russians fought most of their war beneath the triple goads of patriotism, compulsion and indifference to human cost, the Anglo-Americans were able to husband lives until their industrial resources could be deployed to overwhelming advantage. They chose to deploy far smaller frontline ground combat forces in proportion to their national populations than either Russia or Germany. David French, author of an acute study of the British Army, observes: “In absolute terms the British reduced their casualties716 simply by abstaining for long periods