Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [217]
When the German parachutists landed, the defenders—in much superior numbers—should have launched an immediate counterattack on the landing zone before the invaders could reorganise. Instead, British infantry simply sat tight and fired from their positions. As the Germans advanced across the island, one British officer was dismayed to see men of the King’s Own fleeing for their lives in the face of mortar fire. At 1800 on the first day, call sign Stupendous of the Long Range Desert Group signalled bitterly from Leros: “Lack of RAF support absolutely pitiful791: ships sat around here all day, and Stukas just laughed at us.” The defence lacked mobility and, more important, motivation and competence to match that of the Germans. Jeffrey Holland, who served as an infantry sergeant on Leros, wrote later: “As the battle progressed, it was evident that the enemy792 had deployed … first-class combat troops, who demonstrated consummate skill, courage and self-reliance.” An SBS man wrote of one scene he observed: “We were amazed to see groups of British soldiers793 in open route order proceeding away from the battle area … The colonel stopped and interrogated them, and they said they had orders to retire to the south. Many were without arms, very dejected and exceedingly tired.”
Brigadier Tilney lost control of most of his force at an early stage, and was enraged to find units retiring without orders. He threatened two battalion commanders with court-martial, for refusing to order their units into attack. Jeffrey Holland wrote: “The Germans moved quickly from one position to another794, but never retreated; they seemed willing to accept a high rate of casualties. Their officers and NCOs exposed themselves to fire when directing an attack or defense. They seemed indifferent to the British fire which they sensed was tentative; neither well coordinated nor directed.”
Some courageous British counterattacks were launched, in which a battalion commanding officer and several company commanders were killed. At midnight on November 14795, Bletchley Park decrypted a German signal warning that the position of the invasion force on Leros was “critical,” and that it was essential to get heavy weapons ashore immediately, to swing the battle. The Germans on Leros experienced nothing like the walkover they had enjoyed on Kos. But the defenders, having failed to take the initiative at the outset, never regained it. The terrain made it almost impossible for men to dig in, to protect themselves from bombing. Too often in World War II, British troops perceived enemy air superiority as a sufficient excuse to reconcile themselves to defeat.
Maitland Wilson kept alive Churchill’s hopes of salvaging the battle, signalling on November 14 that British troops on Leros, though “somewhat tired,” were “full of fight and well fed.” To the end, the prime minister pressed for more energetic measures to support them. On the evening of the sixteenth, as he approached Malta en route to the Tehran conference, he signalled Air Chief Marshal Tedder: “I much regret not to see you tonight796, as I should have pressed upon you the vital need of sustaining Leros by every possible means. This is much the most important thing that is happening in the Mediterranean in the next few days … I do not see how you can disinterest yourself in the fate of Leros.” Tedder wrote scathingly afterwards: “One would have thought that some of the bitter lessons797 of Crete would have been sufficiently fresh in mind to have prevented a repetition … It seems incredible now, as it did then, that after four years’ experience of modern war, people forgot that air-power relies on secure bases, weather, and effective radius of action.”
At 1600 hours on November 17, the fifth day after the landing on Leros, Tilney surrendered. Some 3,000 British and 5,500 Italian soldiers became prisoners. Almost a