Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [224]
The first meeting of the Sextant conference took place on November 23, and addressed the Far East. The U.S. contingent arrived in an irritable mood, because prior word of the gathering had leaked to correspondents, increasing the security risk. The British were galled by the attendance of Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, at American insistence. Much attention was given to Chinese issues. The British shared U.S. faith neither in China’s value as an ally, nor in the massive commitment to provide aid “over the Hump” of the Himalayas. They had not forgotten that, a few months earlier, Roosevelt had urged them to cede possession of Hong Kong to Chiang Kai-shek as a “gesture of goodwill.” This caused Eden to observe823 to Harry Hopkins that he had not heard the president suggest any similar act of largesse at American expense. Smuts said emolliently: “We are inclined to forget the President’s difficulties824. There is a very strong undercurrent against him. The things the Americans do are based partly on ignorance, partly on their determination to get power. We have learned hard lessons in the four years of the war. They have had no hard lessons. Yet we do not want to wait another four years while they learn them.”
The British were right about the intractability of U.S. leaders on China, but their dismissive attitude increased Anglo-American tensions. Churchill made much of plans to launch Orde Wingate and his Chindits on ambitious deep penetration missions in northern Burma. The Americans, however, regarded these as reflecting the characteristic British enthusiasm for sideshows, at the expense of major operations. They favoured Buccaneer, a big coastal landing in Burma. The British, however, now argued that Mediterranean action, not to mention Overlord, would be fatally compromised by diverting landing craft to the Bay of Bengal.
At the second plenary session on November 24, Churchill complained vigorously about the loss of Kos and Leros. He also said it was untrue that he favoured unlimited operations in Italy: he was committed to Overlord “up to the hilt.” But he sought agreement that Allied armies should aim to reach a line between Pisa and Rimini. Eisenhower addressed the conference on the twenty-sixth. He was still only Mediterranean supreme commander, unaware that Overlord would soon become his personal responsibility. He said that he supported British aspirations both in the valley of the Po and the Aegean. “He [Eisenhower] stressed the vital importance of continuing the maximum possible operations in an established theatre since much time was invariably lost when the scene of action was changed.” This was welcome to Churchill, if not to Marshall.
The conference’s British administrators were at pains to offer hospitality matching that which the Americans had provided at Casablanca in January. But given Britain’s impoverished state, they were embarrassed by their guests’ locustlike response. The assembled throng of officials and service officers accounted for 20,000 cigarettes and 75 cigars. Each day, 500 beers, 80 bottles of whiskey, 12 of brandy, and 34 of gin were consumed. It was decided that at future summits, out of respect for the rationed people of Britain, those attending should at least be asked to pay for their own drinks.
Between sessions, Churchill took Roosevelt to see the Pyramids, and talked enthusiastically to his staff about the warmth of their relationship. Yet Eden described the Cairo conference as “among the most difficult I ever attended.” British fortunes in the Far East were at their lowest ebb. Imperial forces were apparently incapable of breaking through into Burma in the face of a numerically inferior