Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [229]
The British Chiefs of Staff wanted Maitland Wilson to succeed Eisenhower as Mediterranean supremo, and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder to become Ike’s deputy for Overlord. Churchill favoured Alexander for British commander on D-Day—as also did Eisenhower. The War Cabinet demurred, urging Montgomery in deference to public opinion as well as military desirability. Surprisingly, Churchill acceded to their view. This was certainly the right appointment, for Montgomery was a much superior general. But it was unusual for Churchill to allow himself to be baulked by ministers on a matter of such importance. Most likely, willingness to allow Alexander to remain in Italy reflected the importance which he attached to operations there. He believed, mistakenly, that “Alex” could provide the impetus he perceived as lacking. Macmillan strongly urged847 Alexander’s appointment, noting that Maitland Wilson had been Middle East C-in-C for a year, yet had done nothing to galvanise the slothful British war machine in Egypt. The Americans finally acceded to British wishes for Alexander to take over in the Mediterranean, precisely because they attached much less importance to Italy than to Overlord.
On December 22, the British Chiefs of Staff signalled from London that they supported Churchill’s proposal for a new amphibious assault in Italy. Initial planning assumed that there was only enough shipping to move a single division, while both Churchill and the Chiefs wanted to land two. On Christmas Day, Eisenhower, Maitland Wilson, Alexander, Tedder and Cunningham converged by air upon Carthage from all over the Mediterranean to discuss plans for Operation Shingle, a descent on the coast at Anzio, just south of Rome, provisionally scheduled for January 20. The meeting endorsed a two-division initial assault, subject to the proviso that it should not threaten the May date for Overlord.
On December 27, Churchill flew to Marrakesh for a prolonged spell of recuperation. “I propose to stay here in the sunshine,” he wrote to Roosevelt, “till I am quite strong again.” On his second day at the Villa Taylor, to his surprise and delight, he learned that the president had approved Shingle, subject only to renewed emphasis upon the sanctity of the French invasion date. This, however, was now to be put back a month, until June, at the insistence of Eisenhower and Montgomery. Having studied the D-Day plan for the first time, they were convinced that additional preparation, as well as a reinforced initial landing, were essential. The new date would fall in the first week of June. Churchill was hostile to the use of the word invasion in the context of D-Day: “Our object is the liberation of Europe848 from German tyranny … we ‘enter’ the oppressed countries rather than ‘invade’ them and … the word ‘invasion’ must be reserved for the time when we cross the German frontier. There is no need for us to make a present to Hitler of the idea that he is the defender of a Europe we are seeking to invade.” This was, of course, one semantic dispute which he lost.
On January 4, 1944, he wrote to Eden: “I am getting stronger ever day … All my thoughts are on ‘Shingle,’ which as you may well imagine I am watching intensely.” His convalescence in Marrakesh ended on January 14. He flew to Gibraltar, where Maitland Wilson and Cunningham gave him a final briefing on the Anzio plan. Then he boarded the battleship King George V to sail home. On the night of January 17 he landed at Plymouth, where he boarded the