Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [274]
In almost every European country freed from German domination, former resistance groups armed by the SOE sought to assert themselves in governance. In France, only de Gaulle’s extraordinary personal authority and the presence of the Anglo-American armies—together with Stalin’s abstention from mobilizing his followers in a country where political instability might damage Soviet interests—made it possible to contain the Communists of the FTP. Many ex-maquisards were hastily drafted into the new French army, for service under Eisenhower. In neighbouring Belgium, the exiled government which returned from London in September found itself facing a strong challenge from left-wingers, including Communist resistance members. Having played a modest role in Belgian liberation, they now, to the alarm of the authorities, refused to be disarmed. There was anger about the Belgian government’s alleged reluctance to impose retribution upon those who had served the German occupation regime. On November 25, leftist trades unionists staged a big demonstration in Brussels and appeared bent upon forcing entry to government buildings. Police overreacted, firing on the demonstrators and wounding forty. In the weeks that followed, tensions ran high. The British Army, strongly backed by Churchill, was determined to tolerate neither a threat to its lines of communications with the battlefront nor any attempted Communist takeover. British troops deployed in Brussels in large numbers.
This action restored a resentful peace, but prompted hostile press comment. U.S. correspondents, especially, deplored the use of force to suppress “heroic resistance fighters,” of whatever political persuasion. Churchill displayed insensitivity in his support for the restoration of long-exiled governments to societies traumatised and radicalised by the experience of occupation. However, American enthusiasm for self-determination underrated both the malevolence of the Communists and the danger of anarchy overtaking the liberated nations.
In Albania and Yugoslavia Communist partisan movements set about seizing control as the Germans fell back. No other political element was strong enough to stop them, and in Serbia Tito enjoyed direct assistance from the Red Army. “Tito is turning very nasty,” Churchill told Smuts on December 3. The Yugoslav partisans demanded the expulsion of the British from the Dubrovnik coastal area. At the same time, in eastern Europe, the “Lublin Poles” proclaimed themselves the provisional government of their country, with no offer of participation for the exiled administration in London. All this made Churchill acutely anxious about the future of Greece. In the first days following German withdrawal, arriving British troops were greeted with unbridled enthusiasm. When Eden visited Athens on October 26, his car was mobbed by cheering crowds. Lord Moyne, accompanying him, said brightly: “It is good that there is one country1001 where we are so popular.”
The Greek honeymoon ended abruptly. Armed factions roamed city streets, amid well-founded reports that Communists were slaughtering alleged “reactionaries.” The Papandreou government struggled to assert its control of the country while the Communists of EAM/ELAS refused to demobilise, and guerrilla bands converged on Athens. The British strove to reinforce their weak forces in the capital, scouring the Mediterranean for men. “Everything is degenerating in the Greek government,” the prime minister wrote to Eden on November 28, “and we must make up our minds whether we will assert our will by armed force, or clear out altogether.” Two days later, he reached a predictable decision: “It is important to let it be known that if there is a civil war in Greece we shall be on the side of the Government we have set up in Athens, and that above all we shall not hesitate