Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [277]
For Churchill, the only positive news coming out of Greece was that the Russians appeared to be holding back. “This is good,”1010 he wrote to Eden, “and shows how Stalin is playing the game.” For once, the prime minister’s optimism was justified. Throughout the unfolding imbroglio in Greece there was no sign that Moscow sought to meddle. Churchill, indeed, was moved to assert that on this issue he found the Russians much more biddable than the Americans. Stalin acknowledged spheres of influence, however broadly he sought to draw his own. Roosevelt did not.
On December 8, 1944, there was a stormy Commons debate about Greece, in which Emanuel Shinwell and Aneurin Bevan, men of the left, led the attack on the government. Churchill, who once more chose to remind the House that it could dismiss him if it so wished, won a vote of confidence by 279 votes to 30. But many MPs remained dissatisfied. Harold Nicolson thought the prime minister misread the mood of the House, which “at its best was one of distressed1011 perplexity, and at its worst of sheer red fury.” Harold Macmillan, who attended the debate, saw the prime minister afterwards in the Downing Street Annexe. He found him tired and petulant: “He rambled on1012 in rather a sad and depressed way. The debate had obviously tired him very much, and I think he realised the dangers inherent in the Greek policy on which we are now embarked. He has won the debate, but not the battle of Athens.”
Churchill seemed to have dug in his heels. He cabled Rex Leeper, the British ambassador in Greece, on December 10: “In Athens as everywhere else our maxim is ‘no peace without victory.’” Yet Lt. Gen. Ronald Scobie, commanding British troops in Greece, signalled that he lacked sufficient men to hold the capital, never mind to enforce the prime minister’s desired disarmament of the guerrillas. Alexander was now Mediterranean C-in-C, having replaced Maitland Wilson, who was dispatched to become the British military representative in Washington following the sudden death of Sir John Dill. Churchill urged Alexander to find more troops for Greece.
Relations with the Americans took a sharp turn for the worse. On December 5, Churchill had signalled to Scobie, urging him to adopt a ruthless policy towards the Communist guerrillas: “Do not hesitate to fire at any armed male in Athens who assails the British authority or Greek authority … act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress.” Jock Colville sent this message at five a.m., when amid exhaustion he forgot to mark it “GUARD”—not to be shown to Americans. Adm. Ernest King, on his own initiative and even before learning of Churchill’s draconian signal, ordered that U.S. shipping should not be used to supply or reinforce the British in Greece. Churchill cabled Harry Hopkins on December 9: “It grieves me very much to see signs of our drifting apart at a time when unity becomes even more important, as dangers recede and faction arises.” Hopkins persuaded Admiral King to rescind his order, apparently without reference to Roosevelt. But a Washington Post editorial declared on December 9: “The American people simply do not relish the spectacle of Sherman tanks going into action against the men who held the pass in war-stricken Hellas.” Correspondent