Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [40]
One part of the British Commonwealth offered no succour to the “mother country”: the Irish Free State, bitterly hostile to Britain since it gained independence in 1922, sustained nominal allegiance by a constitutional quirk, under the terms of the island’s partition treaty. Churchill had heaped scorn upon Neville Chamberlain’s 1938 cession of Britain’s Irish “treaty ports” to the Dublin government. As first lord of the Admiralty, in 1939, he contemplated military action against Eire, as the southern Irish dominion was known. Amid the desperate circumstances of June 1940, however, he responded cautiously to a suggestion by Chamberlain—of all people—that Ireland should be obliged by force to yield up its harbours, which might play a critical role in keeping open Britain’s Atlantic lifeline. Churchill opposed this, fearing a hostile reaction in the United States. Instead, the British government urged Lord Craigavon, prime minister of the Protestant north, which remained part of the United Kingdom, to seek a meeting with Irish prime minister Eamon de Valera to discuss the defence of their common island. Craigavon, like most of his fellow Ulstermen, loathed the Catholic southerners. He dismissed this notion out of hand.
Yet in late June, London presented a remarkable and radical secret proposal to Dublin: Britain would make a principled commitment to a postwar united Ireland, in return for immediate access to Irish ports and bases. Britain’s ambassador in Dublin reported de Valera’s stony response. The taoiseach would commit himself only to the neutrality of a united Ireland, though he said unconvincingly that he “might” enter the war after the British government made a public declaration of commitment to union.
The British government nonetheless urged Dublin to conduct talks with the Belfast regime about a prospective union endorsed by Britain, in return for Eire’s belligerence. Chamberlain told the Cabinet, “I do not believe that the Ulster government would refuse to play their part to bring about so favourable a development.” De Valera again declined to accept deferred payment. MacDonald cabled London, urging Churchill to offer personal assurances. The prime minister wrote in the margin of this message: “But all contingent upon127 Ulster agreeing & S. Ireland coming into the war.”
On June 26, Chamberlain belatedly reported these exchanges to Craigavon, saying: “You will observe that the document128 takes the form of an enquiry only, because we have not felt it right to approach you officially with a request for your assent unless we had first a binding assurance from Eire that they would, if the assent were given, come into the war … If therefore they refuse the plan you are in no way committed, and if they accept you are still free to make your own comments or objections as may think fit.” The Ulsterman cabled back: “Am profoundly shocked and disgusted129 by your letter making suggestions so far-reaching behind my back and without any pre-consultation with me. To such treachery to loyal Ulster I will never be a party.” Chamberlain, in turn, responded equally angrily to what he perceived as Craigavon’s insufferable parochialism. He concluded, “Please remember the serious nature130 of the situation which requires that every effort be made to meet it.”
The War Cabinet, evidently unimpressed by Craigavon’s anger, now strengthened its proposal to Dublin: