Winston's War_ Churchill, 1940-1945 - Max Hastings [85]
The critical choice for Britain, after June 22, 1941, was how far to deplete its own inadequate armoury to aid the Russians. The Cretan experience intensified British paranoia about paratroops. It was feared that German night airborne landings in southern England might negate all calculations about the Royal Navy’s and the RAF’s ability to frustrate an amphibious armada. On June 29, Churchill offered the War Office one of his more fanciful projections: “We have to contemplate the descent from the air of perhaps a quarter of a million parachutists, glider-borne or crash-landed aeroplane troops. Everyone in uniform, and anyone else who likes, must fall upon these wherever they find them and attack them with the utmost alacrity—‘Let every one / Kill a Hun.’”
Against this background, the service ministers and Chiefs of Staff strongly opposed sending planes and tanks to Russia. Here was a mirror image of the debate in Washington about Britain. Churchill’s soldiers, sailors and airmen displayed as much reluctance as their American brethren had done a year earlier to dispatch precious weapons to a nation that might be defeated before they could be put to use.
The Russians scarcely assisted their own cause. On the one hand, they made fantastic demands upon Churchill’s government: for twenty-five British divisions to be shipped to Russia; for an army to stage an immediate landing on the Continent, to force the Germans to fight on a “second front”—a phrase of which much more would be heard. On the other hand, they confronted British diplomats and soldiers in Russia with a wall of silence about their own struggle. An American guest at a London lunch party dominated by political grandees wrote afterwards: “It was quite evident that all of the Britishers296 were deeply distrustful of the Russians. Nobody really knew much about what was happening.”
Until the end of the war, the British learned more about the Eastern Front from Ultra intercepts of enemy signals than from their supposed allies in Moscow. Many German operational reports were swiftly available in London. Rigorous security sought to conceal from the enemy the fact that Bletchley Park was breaking their codes. Churchill was much alarmed by a report which appeared in the Daily Mirror headed SPIES TRAP NAZI CODE. The story began: “Britain’s radio spies are at work297 every night … taking down the Morse code messages which fill the air … In the hands of experts they might produce a message of vital importance to our Intelligence Service.” The Mirror piece was published in absolute ignorance of Ultra, and merely described the activities of British amateur radio “hams.” But Churchill wrote to Duff Cooper, then still information minister, deploring such reporting. He was morbidly sensitive to the peril of drawing the slightest German attention to their radio security.
Yet there were dangerous indiscretions, including one by the prime minister himself in a BBC broadcast on August 24. He drew upon Ultra intercepts to highlight the numbers of civilians being murdered by the SS in Russia. The Germans noticed. Hitler’s top police general, SS-Obergruppenführer Kurt Daluege, signalled all his units on September 13: “The danger of enemy298 decryption of wireless messages is great. For this reason only non-sensitive information