You Did What__ Mad Plans and Great Historical Disasters - Bill Fawcett [37]
Robert E. Lee had issued orders for the next phase of his invasion (Army of Northern Virginia Special Order Number 191), which outlined his plans, and had disseminated it to his men, detailing how he was dividing his forces with plans for them to converge on Harpers Ferry and Boonsboro several days hence. George’s acquisition of these orders would enable him to predict his opponents’ moves, counter them, and outmaneuver them in such a way as to exploit their division, and damage them beyond repair, thus enabling him to realize the quick and decisive victory that was needed to reestablish his reputation.
Unfortunately, Union commanders were not usually on the circulation list for Confederate orders and memos, so it was extremely unlikely that such detailed orders could make their way into George’s hands…but somehow that was exactly what happened.
Lee’s ranks had suffered some recent dissension. Though his subordinate officers, such as Longstreet and Jackson, held Lee in the highest regard in terms of respect (a quality not shared by McClellan and his subordinates), hurt feelings and tactical disagreements about everything from large-scale military planning to the allocation of seized ambulances were beginning to come into play as the Confederate force became worn down by the sheer superior numbers that were being brought to bear against them by the Union forces. Thus dissension led to a certain degree of sloppiness all the way down the line, and privileged communications were not always treated with the heightened security that they required. So when Lee divided his forces and then sent out the message that included the timetable and point of rendezvous, a situation occurred that led to one copy of these orders going astray.
Two soldiers in McClellan’s Twenty-seventh Indiana were resting off the roadside and in the woods outside of Frederick when they discovered the remnants of a rebel campsite that had been recently deserted. Among the Confederate castoffs were some rags and busted equipment and three slightly soggy cigars carefully wrapped in some paper.
After examining the cigars carefully and determining that they could be dried out in the sun and thus rendered serviceable (if not as good as new), the soldiers were about to discard their wrinkled wrappings when they noticed some writing on it.
Army of Northern Virginia Special Order Number 191
Both of them realized that this wrapping was indeed more important than the cigars, and hustled their way back to the command center so that the recently acquired Confederate missive could be moved up the chain of command to McClellan. This information could allow him to direct his forces to pursue the split forces of Lee, who were already behind in their tactical schedule.
McClellan was apprehensive about this unexpected good fortune. Were these orders real? Were they accurate? Could this be a trap? Even though time was of the essence, the West Point graduate and self-appointed military genius of the Union forces decided to review the situation from all angles before concluding that it would indeed be beneficial to take advantage of the allegedly divided forces of his Confederate counterpart, and immediately put in motion a plan to do so.
That plan resulted in the Battle of Antietam, the single bloodiest day in U.S. military history, when McClellan’s forces engaged with Lee’s.
Lee was outnumbered, but McClellan was overly cautious and on numerous occasions slow to react to changes in circumstance. As a result the Union suffered over twelve thousand casualties, as compared to slightly over ten thousand for the Confederates.
Moreover, McClellan was more worried about suffering a defeat than pressing for a victory, and as a result he never fully pressed his numeric superiority against Lee’s divided force, as if he believed that Lee’s orders were in reality bait for a trap in which an undisclosed Confederate supplementary force might ambush them once they