A Sea in Flames - Carl Safina [145]
21 “His experience was largely in land drilling” B. Casselman and Russell Gold, “BP Decisions Set Stage for Disaster,” Wall Street Journal, May 27, 2010; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704026204575266560
930780190.html?KEYWORDS=negative+test.
22 “I raised my concerns” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010,” testimony of Paul Johnson, transcript p. 205, lines 7–17, August 23, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/external/content/document/3043/
903575/1/USCGHEARING%2023_Aug_10.pdf.
23 “Mr. Bob Kaluza called me to his office” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Leo Lindner, transcript pp. 272 and 313, July 19, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856483/.
24 “Let’s face it” W. Semple, e-mail to Mark Loehr, September 19, 2010.
25 “We’re in the exploration group” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Ron Sepulvado, transcript p. 63, lines 5–6, July 20, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856499/.
26 Production zone between 18,051 and 18,223 feet BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
27 “The biggest risk associated with this cement job” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 87, lines 2–4, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
28 Nitrified foamed cement P. Parsons, “The Macondo Well: Part 3 in a Series About the Macondo Well (Deepwater Horizon) Blowout,” Energy Training Resources, LLC, July 15, 2010; https://www.energytrainingresources.com/data/default/content/Macondo.pdf.
29 The depth created concern D. Hammer, “Deepwater Horizon’s Ill-Fated Oil Well Could Have Been Handled More Carefully, Hearings Reveal,” May 29, 2010, NOLA.com; http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hammer-hearings-cg.html.
30 “That nitrogen, it could be a bad thing” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Jimmy Harrell, transcript p. 72, lines 20–22, May 27, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/670139/.
31 “We were concerned” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Mark Hafle, transcript p. 45, lines 8–12, May 28, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/670171/.
32 BP held an in-house contest A. G. Breed, “The Well Is Dead, but Gulf Challenges Live On,” Associated Press, September 19, 2010.
33 “To see if adding more centralizers will help,” and related discussion U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy