A Sea in Flames - Carl Safina [146]
2010.6.14.pdf.
34 “It was a bigger risk to run the wrong centralizers” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 307, lines 1–25, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
35 “The BP Macondo team erroneously believed” BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 35, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
36 “That subject never came up” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 307, lines 1–25, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
37 “Well, we didn’t know if we could find them” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 205, lines 1–25, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
38 “I don’t know of any” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 356, line 22, July 22, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
39 “I never knew it was part of the report” “USCG/BOEM Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of John Guide, transcript p. 269, lines 7–8, July 22 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856503/.
40 “Although the decision not to use twenty-one centralizers” BP’s Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, p. 35, September 8, 2010; http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/
incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/
Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf.
41 Kill pill as spacer, and quotes about using it D. Hilzenrath, “Credibility of BP Oil Spill Study Is Challenged,” Washington Post, September 11, 2010; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/11/
AR2010091104579.html.
42 Spacer fluid abnormally used, and that spacer could have affected the blowout preventer, and “would have required disposal,” and “snot on the deck” D. Hammer, “Finger-Pointing over Deepwater Horizon Explosion Grows Heated,” July 19, 2010, NOLA.com; http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/07/finger-pointing_over_deepwater.html. See also M. Kunzelman, “Federal Hearings Resume in Oil Spill Probe,” Chron.com, July 19, 2010; http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/tx/7115149.html.
43 “To my knowledge—well, it filled a function” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater Horizon, with Loss of Life in the Gulf of Mexico,” April 21–22, 2010, testimony of Leo Lindner, transcript p. 321, lines 12–15, July 19, 2010; http://www.deepwaterinvestigation.com/go/doc/3043/856483/.
44 “Why is all this snot on the deck?” “USCG/MMS Marine Board of Investigation into the Marine Casualty, Explosion, Fire, Pollution, and Sinking of Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit Deepwater