A World on Fire_ Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War - Amanda Foreman [489]
5. Howard Jones, Blue and Gray Diplomacy (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2009), p. 232.
6. He added: “Lincoln has a certain moral dignity, but is intellectually inferior, & as men do not generally measure others correctly who are above their own caliber, he has chosen for his instruments mediocre men.… I know the men at the head of affairs on both sides, & I should say that in energy of will, in comprehensiveness of view, in habits & power of command, & in knowledge of economical & fiscal questions, Jefferson Davis is more than equal to Lincoln & all his Cabinet.” Elizabeth Hoon Cawley (ed.), The American Diaries of Richard Cobden (Princeton, 1952), p. 75, Cobden to Bright, October 7, 1862.
7. The Times, October 7, 1862. Even Liberal newspapers were shocked. The Morning Advertiser remarked on October 6: “We can give no credit to President Lincoln … the motive was not any abhorrence of Slavery in itself, but a sordid, selfish motive, nor can we approve the means to which he is prepared to resort.” For Britain, the atrocities committed in the Indian Mutiny were still fresh memories. The suggestion that Lincoln was trying to engineer similar mayhem and bloodshed in the South was enough to stir the public against him.
8. E. D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War, 2 vols. (New York, 1958), vol. 2, p. 44. For an in-depth discussion of the “intervention crisis,” the following sources are indispensible: Robert Huhn Jones, “Anglo-American Relations, 1861–1865, Reconsidered,” Mid-America: An Historical Review, 45 (Jan. 1963), pp. 36–49; Martin P. Claussen, “Peace Factors in Anglo-American Relations, 1861–5,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 26/4 (March 1940), pp. 511–22; Henry Adams, “Why Did Not England Recognize the Confederacy?,” Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, 66 (1972), pp. 204–22; Davis D. Joyce, “Pro-Confederate Sympathy in the British Parliament,” Social Science (April 1969), pp. 95–100; Kinley J. Brauer, “British Mediation and the American Civil War: A Reconsideration,” Journal of Southern History, 38/1 (Feb. 1972), pp. 49–64; Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, “The British Cabinet and the Confederacy: Autumn, 1862,” Maryland Historical Society (Fall 1967), pp. 239–62; Robert L. Reid (ed.), “William E. Gladstone’s ‘Insincere Neutrality’ During the Civil War,” Civil War History, 15/4 (1969), pp. 293–307; Howard Jones, Union in Peril: The Crisis over British Intervention in the Civil War (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992); Brian Jenkins, Britain and the War for the Union, 2 vols. (Montreal, 1974, 1980); and Charles M. Hubbard, The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy (Knoxville, Tenn., 1998).
9. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War, vol. 2, p. 45, Russell to Palmerston, October 2, 1862.
10. Roy Jenkins, Gladstone (London, 1995), p. 472.
11. George Douglas, Eighth Duke of Argyll (1823–1900): Autobiography and Memoirs, ed. the Dowager Duchess of Argyll, 2 vols. (London, 1906), vol. 2, p. 195, Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862.
12. Jenkins, Gladstone, pp. 472, 466.
13. ORN, ser. 2, vol. 3, pp. 549–51, Ambrose Dudley Mann to Judah P. Benjamin, October 7, 1862.
14. John Morely, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone: 1809–1872, 2 vols. (London, 1903), vol. 2, p. 536, and Henry Steele Commager (ed.), The Civil War Archive (New York, 2000), pp. 362–63.
15. Harper’s Magazine, vol. 54, 1877, p. 111.
16. MHS, Adams MSS, Diary of Charles Francis Adams, October 5, 1862.
17. D. P. Crook, The North, the South, and the Powers, 1861–1865 (New York, 1974), p. 266, November 8, 1862.
18. The literature on the cabinet discussions during October and November is voluminous. See E. D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War, vol. 2, p. 52, for a discussion on the memoranda wars.
19. Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams, ed. Ernest Samuels (repr. Boston, 1973), pp. 183–84.
20. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War,