Brand Failures_ The Truth About the 100 Biggest Branding Mistakes of All Time - Matt Haig [26]
Normally, cigarettes produce new varieties based on different levels of tar. For instance, in the UK the Silk Cut brand produced various low-tar varieties – Mild, Low and Ultra Low. The popularities of such low-tar brands has caused cigarette companies to think of ever more ways to try and convince consumers that their unhealthy and anti-social products aren’t as unhealthy or as anti-social as they might have thought. Similar strategies have been deployed in the beer market, with brands such as Bud Light, Coors Light and Miller Lite.
However, some of these strategies take an extreme form. For instance, in the alcohol market there was the case of the beer brand which tried to sell beer-branded mineral water. The brand was Coors. The water it produced was called Coors Rocky Mountain Spring Water. It was launched in 1990 and survived only two years.
In the cigarette industry, the extreme strategy belonged to RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company known for brands such as Camel, Winston, Salem and Doral. In 1988, when the anti-smoking lobbyists could finally claim the majority of public opinion was behind them, and when passive smoking had been officially recognized as a serious danger to health, the company decided to conduct trials on a smokeless cigarette. In total, RJ Reynolds spent US $325 million on creating a smokeless cigarette which it branded as ‘Premier’.
However, problems became apparent straightaway. Firstly, there was the taste issue. One person who ‘smoked’ Premier complained that it ‘tasted like shit’. And he was RJ Reynolds’ chief executive.
Then there was the difficulty of using the product in the first place, as Reporter Magazine (www.robmagazine.com) explains: ‘Inhaling the Premier required vacuum-powered lungs, lighting it virtually required a blowtorch, and, if successfully lit with a match, the sulphur reaction produced a smell and a flavour that left users retching.’
In addition, there was the damaging rumour that the smokeless cigarette could be used as a delivery device for crack cocaine. Hardly the kind of brand association RJ Reynolds had wanted to create.
One of the major forms of controversy was the brand’s possible appeal among younger people. Here is an extract from a statement by many leading US health organizations shortly after RJ Reynolds announced the new project:
The American Cancer Society, American Heart Association, and American Lung Association have filed a petition with the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), asking that Premier be regulated as a drug. In filing this petition, we are not calling for an outright ban on Premier. We want simply for it to be properly tested before people use it.
We are especially concerned that Premier’s intriguing high-tech design will lure children and teenagers into the web of nicotine addiction. RJR’s marketing emphasis on ‘clean enjoyment’ also may lull people who already smoke into a deceptive sense of safety when they really ought to give up the habit altogether.
According to the FDA, any product marketed that claims that it is healthier or safer, must be regulated by the FDA. Conventional cigarettes escape FDA scrutiny because they are promoted for the sheer pleasure of smoking and because the FDA does not consider them to be drugs or food.
In introducing Premier, RJR is stepping beyond that loophole. The RJR claim that Premier is ‘cleaner’ is a poorly disguised way to imply ‘safer’ to thousands of people concerned about the health risks of smoking. RJR knows that if their ads said ‘safer’ in place of ‘cleaner’ the FDA would step in.
In the meantime, RJR promises that Premier is an improvement over conventional cigarettes that burn with foul-smelling smoke. But, we are sceptical. How can we trust the same industry that still refuses to admit that cigarette smoking is harmful?
The real problem though was that smokers didn’t enjoy using the smoke-free product, and non-smokers