Brand Failures_ The Truth About the 100 Biggest Branding Mistakes of All Time - Matt Haig [55]
In an article for the Canadian Journal of Communication, Drexel University’s Priscilla Murphy explored Procter & Gamble’s handling of the Rely tampon incident in relation to ‘games theory’. She argued that by the end, Procter & Gamble’s game plan had improved greatly:
The latter stages of Procter & Gamble’s strategy exemplify a wholly different approach to conflict. What had begun as a classic escalation game became a bargaining venture in which everyone’s desires were examined and coordinated so that each player could live with the agreement. When we are talking about bargaining games we are really looking at the ways in which both sides in a conflict gradually come to agree on a single version of events, a single perspective. What resulted was a stable equilibrium point that, though not ideal, represented the best outcome for each side given the pressures from the other side.
So although the incidents of toxic shock syndrome spelt the end of the Rely brand, Procter & Gamble itself suffered small lasting damage and continues to produce some of the world’s most popular tampon products.
Lessons from Rely
Cooperate don’t aggravate. If Procter & Gamble had cooperated with the health authorities from the start it would have been able to limit the negative media coverage.
Kill the brand, save the company. For companies with numerous brands it is often better to admit defeat early on and terminate a brand for the sake of the overall reputation of the company.
44 Gerber’s PR blunder
In 1986, Gerber, the German baby food manufacturer, made a critical PR mistake. When incidents of glass shards were found in its jars of baby food, Gerber remained tight-lipped and failed to issue a recall. This decision invited a lot of criticism with articles in Business Week, Newsweek and Time openly attacking the company on ethical grounds. Although the pieces of glass had not caused any fatalities, some babies had been severely hurt.
Glass fragments had originally been found in some Gerber products – namely, their apple-plum and apple-cherry juices – in 1984. But in that instance, Gerber handled the problem effectively. Although neither the company nor the authorities found a manufacturing-related cause, Gerber recalled over half a million jars of juice.
In 1986, however, there were over 200 reports of glass being found in Gerber’s baby products across the United States. Although the authorities failed to discover anything that would warrant a recall, Maryland officials banned certain Gerber ranges from being sold anywhere in the state. Gerber’s response? The company sued the state of Maryland. Other than this legal reaction, Gerber did nothing. Not a word was said to the media about the issue, in the hope that the whole fiasco would just pass by.
From Gerber’s perspective, the company was doing nothing wrong. After all, nothing suggested that the fragments of glass were the fault of Gerber’s manufacturing process. It had certainly been under no obligation to recall its products. The company therefore believed that the state of Maryland was in the wrong and took what it saw as the appropriate legal action.
As Gerber saw it, a recall would only serve to generate more media attention and would have a negative impact on sales. It would also be expensive to implement. But Gerber forgot one important thing. Brands are about the public’s perception. It is not about proving who is right or who is wrong. By refusing to talk, Gerber was acting as though it had something to hide.
For a company that built its whole brand identity around the high quality and safety of its products, this was clearly a bad move. If you produce baby food, you have to constantly remind the public that you have parents’ and babies’ best interests at heart. By taking the state of Maryland to court, failing to issue a recall, and by then remaining silent, this