Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [126]
An example may clarify why an empirical approach to the development of typologies and associated typological theories is useful. In the literature on deterrence, an a priori “logical” approach to typologizing outcomes of efforts to achieve deterrence often makes a simple distinction between “success” and “failure.” (This characterization of deterrence outcomes continues to be used, particularly in large-N statistical studies.) An empirical approach relying on explanations for different cases of failure enables the investigator to discover different types of failures and to pinpoint specific explanations for each type of failure.477 The different causal patterns of deterrence failure become part of a typological theory of deterrence. Such a differentiated theory of failures is significantly different from, and often more useful than, a theory that attempts to provide a single explanation for all deterrence failures.
Empirically derived, theory-oriented case studies are particularly suited for discovering equifinality and developing typological theory for the phenomenon in question. Each case may turn out to be useful if it permits the investigator to identify a different causal pattern. Differentiated explanations of the outcomes of the cases which are all instances of the class of events that is being investigated becomes a part of a cumulative typological theory, or what David Dessler has called a “repertoire of causal mechanisms.”478
The investigator should avoid a premature, a priori characterization of variance of the dependent and independent variables. Instead, the variance should emerge via differences discovered in the explanation of the cases. In addition, the investigator should avoid overly general ways of characterizing variance that limit the variance to a few alternatives. For example, using the Alexander George and Richard Smoke deterrence study again, the variance in outcomes of deterrence attempts should not be limited to “success” and “failure”; rather, the case studies and their cumulation into a theory should be sensitive to the presence of equifinality. Hence, the possibility that each case of failure may have a some what different explanation can lead to a typology of failures; similarly with cases of deterrence “success” (if it were possible to make a valid determination of “successful” deterrence).
The causal relationship between arms races and war provides another example of the need for more discriminating conditional generalizations. One comprehensive assessment of the voluminous literature on this problem concludes that “there is still no well-developed theory that describes the conditions under which arms races will or will not lead to war. Nor is there a theory that provides a reliable guide for policymakers.” 479 What available scholarship does tell us is that arms races are neither a necessary condition for the occurrence of war nor a sufficient condition for war. Additional assessment of relevant cases should allow investigators to develop a typological theory of how and under what conditions an arms race will lead to war. Comparative analysis of different cases of a phenomenon may also enable the investigator to identify a number of conditions which, if present in an arms race, increase the likelihood of war. Such a finding would identify ways in which policymakers might act to reduce or control the likelihood that an ongoing arms race might result in war.
There is a danger that such a procedure will lead to an infinite number of types, as it can always be argued that each case is idiosyncratic enough to warrant creation of a new type to encompass it. The investigator can and should exercise judgment as to the extent to which to construct from the cases more and more refined,