Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [127]
The typological theory that emerges obviously depends on what cases are selected for examination. Therefore, at the outset of the research, the development of a typology and its associated theory must be open-ended. For example, new cases of deterrence encounters that are studied may lead to identification of new types of “success” or “failure.” Of course, new cases may turn out to be similar in type to one or another of those already studied.
This research method achieves a cumulation of findings via a “building-block” approach. That is, each case potentially provides a new component in the construction of a comprehensive typological theory. The number of types that will eventually be identified remains indeterminate (although as stated above, not infinite) until more cases are examined.
This approach to theory development strongly differs with large-N statistical methods in its view of cell reduction—i.e., enlarging the scope of types in order to get more cases in each type so that statistical analysis becomes possible. This approach corresponds to what Giovanni Sartori has called moving up the “ladder of abstraction,” or generality.480 Such a shift to a higher level of generality eliminates the possibility of a more differentiated analysis and reduces the richness of empirical studies. In other words, moving up the ladder of generality reduces the probability of observed correlations that apply to the defined concept. For example, we can make only low probability observations on the relationship of parties and electoral laws in democracies, but we can observe higher probability correlations among specific types of parties (ruling, opposition, swing-voting, etc.) in states with specific types of electoral laws (winner-take-all, proportional, mixed, etc.) in specific types of democracies (presidential, parliamentary, etc.). While moving down the ladder of generality increases richness and raises observed correlations, it comes at the cost of parsimony and generalizability.
To be sure, cell reduction may be undertaken not only to permit statistical analysis but also for theoretical reasons. Investigators may use it in to identify and explain general characteristics that a large number of cases may have in common. Even when cell reduction is undertaken largely to satisfy the requirements of statistical analysis it may still generate new concepts for the wider and broader types it creates. Cell reduction is unwarranted, however, when it is not guided by theoretical hypotheses and instead constitutes an ad hoc opportunistic search for some findings of a general character to which new conceptual labels can be attached. This approach to theory development may produce findings or nonfindings that are artifacts of the push for cell reduction in order to make statistical analysis possible. An investigator employing an open-ended approach to developing typological theory can always engage in cell reduction at a later stage in the inquiry to formulate more general findings, so there is no need to resort to cell reduction prematurely.
The inductive development of typological theories has important limitations. One cannot infer from case findings how frequently each type of causal pattern appears in the universe of cases of that phenomenon. This limitation arises from the fact that typological theories can be constructed without identifying a representative sample of cases. The goal of typological theorizing is to identify the variety of causal patterns that can lead to the outcome of interest and determine the conditions under which these patterns occur. Observations on the frequency with which particular patterns occur are usually a secondary concern. In fact, investigators engaged in developing typological theory