Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [174]
In summarizing the findings of this research program, Homer-Dixon emphasizes that “environmental scarcity by itself is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of violent conflict … when it does play a role, it always interacts with other contextual factors—be they physical or social—to generate violence.” To gauge the relative causal contribution of environmental scarcity “is especially intractable… . I therefore try to avoid entangling myself in the metaphysical debate about the relative importance of causes.” But Homer-Dixon is able to show that for many conflicts around the world, violence “cannot be properly understood or explained without taking account of the causal role of environmental scarcity.”708
Homer-Dixon subscribes to the emphasis we have given to the diagnostic rather than the prescriptive contribution that policy-relevant research can make. Each case of environmentally induced conflict “is complex and unique… . Policy tools available in one case will not be available in another… . Successful policy intervention thus requires customization based on a careful analysis of the character of the specific case and of the policy tools available in that case.” In this book, Homer-Dixon emphasizes, “I can do no more than give policymakers a rough understanding of key causal processes and of useful intervention points in these processes.”709
ALEXANDER L. GEORGE AND RICHARD SMOKE, DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE. NEW YORK: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1974.
This was the first study to make explicit use of the three phases of structured, focused comparison. The research objectives were, first, to subject the then-dominant abstract, deductive theory of deterrence to critical examination; second, to question its suitability as a prescriptive model for policymaking; and third, to call attention to the fact that deterrence theory does not adequately define its own scope or relevance as an instrument of foreign policy and must be absorbed into a broader influence theory for dealing with the conflict potential in interstate relations.710
The authors studied a particular subclass of efforts to employ extended deterrence; they focused on eleven U.S. efforts during the Cold War to employ this strategy on behalf of weaker allies and friendly neutrals. The authors explicitly forego efforts to generalize from this subclass to the total universe of deterrence efforts. The scope of the findings is appropriately delimited.711
A standard list of general questions was developed and employed in each of the case studies to ensure comparability and cumulation.
The third phase of the study (“Toward a Reformulation of Deterrence Theory”) draws on the case findings to develop a more refined, empirically grounded, and differentiated theory of deterrence than the abstract deductive theory. The case studies examined made use of process-tracing to derive explanations of the outcomes of deterrence efforts. Since valid identification of cases of deterrence success is extremely difficult, no cases of this kind were included in the study.712 However, some instances of deterrence failure that were studied could also be regarded as partial successes, since the adversary chose limited options for challenging deterrence rather than all-out attacks. In reformulating deterrence theory, the authors presented propositions and hypotheses (derived indirectly from analysis of deterrence failures) regarding conditions that would “favor” deterrence success, though not necessarily serving as necessary or sufficient conditions for success.
The authors noted that the defender’s strategy and tactics for achieving extended deterrence had received the most attention in early deterrence theory. Several criticisms were offered: