Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [175]
George and Smoke also noted that the decision of states on whether to and how to challenge a defender’s deterrence effort had received much less attention and insufficiently detailed analysis in early deterrence theory. Accordingly, they presented a formulation of “initiation theory.”713 In addition, their study of deterrence outcomes focused on how the initiator’s choice of a strategy for challenging a deterrence commitment was guided by its perception of the nature of the defender’s commitment.
Eight variables having to do with the initiator’s utility calculations were drawn from the case analyses. Two of them were singled out as of major significance: the initiator’s estimate of whether he or she could calculate and control the risks of each of the several options available for challenging deterrence; and the initiator’s view of the defender’s commitment, which could take one of three forms: (1) the initiator’s belief (correct or incorrect) that the defender had not made a commitment to forcefully oppose an attack on a weak ally or friendly neutral; (2) the initiator’s uncertainty whether the defender had made a commitment to defend an ally; or (3) the initiator’s belief that the defender’s commitment was “soft” and subject to erosion by tactics for challenging it.714
Figure A.4. Typology of Deterrence Failure (causal patterns of the different ways deterrence can fail).
Figure A.5. Three Interrelated Components of Deterrence Theory.
Case findings suggested that a relatively parsimonious theory for explaining different types of deterrence failures could be formulated by focusing on the interaction of these two major conditions. In this way, a typology of deterrence failures was identified that noted three different ways in which the two conditions interacted. These three patterns of deterrence failure and their explanations are summarized in Figure A.4, “Typology of Deterrence Failures.” In all three types of deterrence failure, the initiator believed that the risks of deterrence by means of a particular method were calculable and controllable. However, the initiator’s view of the defender’s commitment varied and led to a different type of challenge to deterrence. The three types of deterrence failure were the “fait accompli” attack, the “limited probe,” and the “controlled pressure” tactic (which entailed resort by the initiator either to piecemeal “salami tactics,” “diplomatic blackmail,” or “blockade.”) The historical cases of deterrence failure studied were examples of either one or another of these three types.
An interesting—and unanticipated—result of the study was the development of a concatenated theory of deterrence, one that formulated subtheories for important components of the deterrence process. Two of its components have already been discussed—the authors’ reformulation of “commitment” theory and of “initiation” theory. The third component of the concatenated theory was arrived at by noting that in a number of the historical cases, deterrence failed in stages. This gave the defender an opportunity to respond in some fashion as the crisis developed before deterrence failed entirely. This led the authors to formulate another component of deterrence theory, “Response Theory,” which identified various options for responding to warnings that deterrence might be failing. The three components of the concatenated theory are depicted in Figure A.5.
The authors claim that their concatenated theory should help policy analysts and policymakers to make better diagnoses of new situations that arise.715 Awareness that extended deterrence can fail in three different ways should contribute