Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [194]
186
For discussion of this point, see George and McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” pp. 38-39.
187
The nature and requirements of historical explanations are discussed in Chapter 10.
188
The need to avoid selecting cases that favor a particular theory and that constitute easy rather than tough tests of a theory was emphasized in Chapter 4.
189
This brief discussion draws from the fuller discussion of these problems in Chapter 2, “Case Study Methods and Research on the Interdemocratic Peace,” which also provides illustrative materials. See also Olav Njølstad’s chapter, “Learning from History? Case Studies and the Limits to Theory-Building,” in Nils Petter Gleditsch and Olav Njølstad, eds., Arms Races: Technological and Political Dynamics (London: Sage Publications, 1990), pp. 220-245. Njølstad also offers several useful suggestions for dealing with these problems, which are summarized in Chapter 2.
190
For an early discussion of the practice of transforming a historical explanation into an analytical one see Gabriel Almond et al., Crisis, Choice, and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973). This study is among those summarized in the Appendix, “Studies That Illustrate Research Design.”
191
See Chapter 4 for a discussion of Task Four and the critical importance of how variance in the variables is described, our caution against a priori decisions on such matters, and the desirability of making such determinations after preliminary analysis of the cases.
192
See, for example, how this task was dealt with in studies such as Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).
193
Similar problems arise in efforts by scholars to make use of archival materials and interviews from Soviet sources. See, for example, the correspondence between Mark Kramer, who expressed concern about the use of oral histories by Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, and their responses in “Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 212-218. See also “Commentaries on ‘An Interview With Sergo Mikoyan’” by Raymond L. Garthoff, Barton J. Bernstein, Marc Trachtenberg, and Thomas G. Paterson in Diplomatic History, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 223-256.
194
Ian S. Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 3 (September 1996), pp. 605-618.
195
Ibid.
196
See the preface to Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
197
The different ways historians and political scientists tend to define the task of explanation and the different questions they often ask of available data is discussed in helpful detail in Deborah Larson, “Sources and Methods in Cold War History: The Need for a Theory-Based Archival Approach,” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 327-350. The dangers of using studies by historians that may reflect their selection bias are noted also by Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science.”
198
The importance of studying contemporary journalistic sources in order to understand part of the context in which policymakers were operating became a central methodological procedure in Deborah Larson’s research. In conjunction with thorough research into archival sources, Larson spent a great deal of time going through contemporary journalists’ accounts of developments, a procedure which helped her to appreciate the impact of events that came to the attention of policymakers on their perceptions and responses.