Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [195]
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One example comes from the work of one of the present authors, Andrew Bennett. In an unpublished study of the 1929 stock market crash for the Federal Reserve Board, he found by reading the newspapers of the period that there are strong reasons to question the often-cited argument that the crash was caused by excessive speculation on margin credit rates “as low as 10 percent,” or the supposedly common practice of buying stocks by putting up only 10 percent of their value as equity. In fact, while no systematic data exists for the margins typically set, most newspaper accounts suggest that margins of 40 to 50 percent or higher were the norm. Banks offered to lower margin rates to 10 percent as an extraordinary step to try halt the crash, based on the assumption that the crash was caused by a liquidity crisis as plunging stock values led to margin calls on stocks and forced sales of those stocks. The fact that this measure failed to stem the crash, and that bond purchases were strong during the crash, suggest that perhaps the crash was caused not so much by loose margin credit as by the classic bursting of a speculative bubble, and a revaluation of the relative value of stocks versus bonds. This explanation is more in line with modern theories of stock market behavior. In any event, a simple reading of the newspapers reveals that explanations of the crash cannot unproblematically accept that margins were typically 10 percent.
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This framework was initially developed and employed in a study that examined methods for inferring the intentions, beliefs, and other characteristics of a political elite from its propaganda by means of qualitative content analysis. See Alexander L. George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1959; and Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 107-121.
In a personal communication (March 26, 2000), Jeremi Suri drew on his own research experience to emphasize the need to distinguish between various types of archival materials. Personal correspondence and diaries of historical actors can be very helpful in developing understanding of their general beliefs about political life, particularly since such materials are often not designed to persuade others; such sources can reflect the emotions experienced at different junctures. Also, the “incoming files” of various reading matter insofar as it can be established that it was read, may throw light on the actor’s ideology or cultural beliefs and the role they may play in policymaking.
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Some of these possibilities are among the various “malfunctions” of the policymaking system discussed in Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking and Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), chap. 6.
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This observation was provided by a scholar who must remain anonymous.
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Stephen Pelz, “Toward A New Diplomatic History: Two and a Half Cheers for International Relations Methods,” in Elman and Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries, p. 100.
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This paragraph and the next one draw on George, Presidential Decisionmaking, pp. 81ff.
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Larry Berman, Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam (New York: Norton, 1982).
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Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: Eisenhower As Leader (New York: Basic Books, 1982).
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As told to Richard Rusk in Daniel S. Papp, ed., As I Saw It (New York: Norton, 1990), cited by Richard Ned Lebow, “Social Science and History: Ranchers versus Farmers,” in Elman and Elman, eds.,