Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [223]
519
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 121-122. Waltz reemphasized this point in “International Politics is Not Foreign Policy,” Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 54-57. See, however, Colin Elman’s observation that Waltz seems to want it both ways, i.e., that structural-realism is and is not a theory of foreign policy, in “Horses for Courses: Why NOT Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?” Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-53.
520
Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; and Randall L. Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.
521
This position is similar to that expressed by some leading proponents of rational choice and game theories. See, for example, the study by Robert Bates et al., Analytic Narratives (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
522
We have taken the phrase “usable knowledge” from Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social Problem Solving (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979).
523
This section draws on George, Bridging the Gap, and Alexander L. George, “The Role of Force in Diplomacy: A Continuing Dilemma for U.S. Foreign Policy,” in Horst W. Brands, ed., The Use of Force After the Cold War (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000).
524
There are a number of important risks associated with giving opponents an ultimatum of which policymakers must be aware and to which appropriate attention must be given in any situation. See George, Bridging the Gap, pp. 81-82.
525
Recall in this connection that John Lewis Gaddis emphasized that over time U.S. administrations pursued significantly different strategies of containment toward the Soviet Union. See his Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), a study that makes use of the method of structured, focused comparison. Two recent studies illustrate how a conceptual model is converted into strategies: Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000); and Bruce W. Jentleson, ed., Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).
526
George, Bridging the Gap.
527
A more detailed discussion is provided in Alexander L. George, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Models of Adversaries,” in Barry R. Schneider and Jerrold M. Post, eds., Know Thy Enemy (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation Center, November 2002), pp. 211-230.
528
This was the major conclusion drawn by George Downs in his survey of research on “Arms Races and War,” in Philip S. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 75.
529
George, Bridging the Gap. See also the important observations by Newsom, “Foreign Policy and Academia,” which notes that prominent faculty specialists are often recruited for high policy positions. Newsom notes that five national