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Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [228]

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p. 15.

690

Ibid., pp. 25ff.

691

Caldwell, American-Soviet Relations, pp. 170ff.

692

Ibid., cf. e.g., pp. 181, 200.

693

Ibid., pp. 228ff.

694

Ibid., p. xii.

695

Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, p. 6.

696

Ibid., p. 3.

697

Ibid., p. 9.

698

Ibid., Appendix to chap. 5, pp. 104-106.

699

Ibid., Appendix to chap. 7, pp. 169-176.

700

Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith, eds., Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 31-32.

701

Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, p. 171.

702

Ibid.

703

Ibid., pp. 172-173.

704

Ibid.

705

Ibid., pp. 173-174.

706

Ibid., p. 174.

707

Ibid., p. 182.

708

Ibid., p. 7.

709

Ibid., p. 10. Homer-Dixon’s research program was critically assessed by Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3 (May 1998), pp. 381-400. A detailed reply was published by Daniel M. Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis, and Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Environment and Violent Conflict: A Response to Gleditsch’s Critique and Some Suggestions for Future Research,” Environmental Report: Change and Security Project, Issue No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center, Summer 2000), pp. 77-94. The authors indicate that their reply “makes use of our work in preparation and highlights misunderstandings of ways in which case studies and process-tracing contribute to theory development.” The exchange also appears in Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds., Environmental Conflict (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000).

710

Seven questionable assumptions and simplifications of the early abstract, deductive theory of deterrence were identified and subjected to critical examination. See George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 71-82, 503-508.

711

That George and Smoke delimit the scope of these findings is overlooked in the critique by Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), p. 162. These two authors correctly emphasize that the findings of a nonrandom sample cannot be projected to the entire universe of deterrence cases, something which, in fact, George and Smoke do not do.

Achen and Snidal are often quoted by other writers only for their criticism of case selection bias in small-n research on deterrence. It is important to note their favorable assessment of key aspects of the George-Smoke study (see below, endnote 171) and their emphasis in the conclusion of their article on the indispensable role that case studies play in the development of theory, and in the rational deterrence type theory they favor (p. 161).

712

George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 516-517.

713

Ibid., chap. 17.

714

In addition to these two conditions (variables), which played a critical role in the initiator’s decision whether and how to challenge deterrence, six other conditions or variables affecting the initiator’s response to a possible commitment were identified. These had to do with the initiator’s evaluation of (a) the adequacy and appropriateness of the defender’s military capabilities for dealing with different options available to the initiator for challenging deterrence; (b) the evaluation of the strength of the defender’s motivation to respond to the initiator’s options; (c) the belief whether only force or the threat of force by the initiator could bring about a change in the status quo it desired; (d) whether the initiator was willing to consider the possibility of some kind of compensation in return for foregoing a challenge to deterrence; (e) the strength of the initiator’s desire to change the status quo by challenging deterrence; and (f) the time pressure felt by the initiator to secure the desired change. These six conditions influenced the initiator’s two major utility calculations

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