Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [228]
690
Ibid., pp. 25ff.
691
Caldwell, American-Soviet Relations, pp. 170ff.
692
Ibid., cf. e.g., pp. 181, 200.
693
Ibid., pp. 228ff.
694
Ibid., p. xii.
695
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, p. 6.
696
Ibid., p. 3.
697
Ibid., p. 9.
698
Ibid., Appendix to chap. 5, pp. 104-106.
699
Ibid., Appendix to chap. 7, pp. 169-176.
700
Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, “Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making,” in Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith, eds., Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 31-32.
701
Homer-Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, p. 171.
702
Ibid.
703
Ibid., pp. 172-173.
704
Ibid.
705
Ibid., pp. 173-174.
706
Ibid., p. 174.
707
Ibid., p. 182.
708
Ibid., p. 7.
709
Ibid., p. 10. Homer-Dixon’s research program was critically assessed by Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3 (May 1998), pp. 381-400. A detailed reply was published by Daniel M. Schwartz, Tom Deligiannis, and Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Environment and Violent Conflict: A Response to Gleditsch’s Critique and Some Suggestions for Future Research,” Environmental Report: Change and Security Project, Issue No. 6 (Washington, D.C.: The Woodrow Wilson Center, Summer 2000), pp. 77-94. The authors indicate that their reply “makes use of our work in preparation and highlights misunderstandings of ways in which case studies and process-tracing contribute to theory development.” The exchange also appears in Paul F. Diehl and Nils Petter Gleditsch, eds., Environmental Conflict (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000).
710
Seven questionable assumptions and simplifications of the early abstract, deductive theory of deterrence were identified and subjected to critical examination. See George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 71-82, 503-508.
711
That George and Smoke delimit the scope of these findings is overlooked in the critique by Christopher Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), p. 162. These two authors correctly emphasize that the findings of a nonrandom sample cannot be projected to the entire universe of deterrence cases, something which, in fact, George and Smoke do not do.
Achen and Snidal are often quoted by other writers only for their criticism of case selection bias in small-n research on deterrence. It is important to note their favorable assessment of key aspects of the George-Smoke study (see below, endnote 171) and their emphasis in the conclusion of their article on the indispensable role that case studies play in the development of theory, and in the rational deterrence type theory they favor (p. 161).
712
George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, pp. 516-517.
713
Ibid., chap. 17.
714
In addition to these two conditions (variables), which played a critical role in the initiator’s decision whether and how to challenge deterrence, six other conditions or variables affecting the initiator’s response to a possible commitment were identified. These had to do with the initiator’s evaluation of (a) the adequacy and appropriateness of the defender’s military capabilities for dealing with different options available to the initiator for challenging deterrence; (b) the evaluation of the strength of the defender’s motivation to respond to the initiator’s options; (c) the belief whether only force or the threat of force by the initiator could bring about a change in the status quo it desired; (d) whether the initiator was willing to consider the possibility of some kind of compensation in return for foregoing a challenge to deterrence; (e) the strength of the initiator’s desire to change the status quo by challenging deterrence; and (f) the time pressure felt by the initiator to secure the desired change. These six conditions influenced the initiator’s two major utility calculations