Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [227]
616
Martin, Coercive Cooperation, p. 96.
617
Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control, p. 16.
618
Lebow, Between Peace and War, pp. 4-5.
619
Ibid., p. 18.
620
Ibid., p. 23.
621
Ibid., p. 18.
622
Ibid., p. 19.
623
Ibid., p. 9.
624
Ibid., p. 13.
625
Ibid., p. 6.
626
Ibid., p. 5.
627
Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking, p. 8.
628
Ibid., p. 9.
629
Ibid.
630
Ibid.
631
Ibid.
632
Ibid., p. 12.
633
Ibid., pp. 1-7.
634
A slightly different version was published by Jack Levy in International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 151-186.
635
Jack S. Levy, “The Role of Crisis Mismanagement in the Outbreak of World War I,” in Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).
636
Ibid.
637
Levy, “The Role of Crisis Mismanagement in the Outbreak of World War I,” p. 63.
638
Ibid., p. 87.
639
Knopf, Domestic Society and International Cooperation, p. ix.
640
Ibid., p. 6.
641
Ibid., p. 2.
642
Ibid., p. 9.
643
Ibid., pp. 251-252.
644
Ibid., pp. 6-8.
645
Ibid., p. 4.
646
Ibid., pp. 9-10. 100. Ibid., p. 250.
647
Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, p. x.
648
Ibid., pp. 35-36. For a broader treatment of this question, see Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
649
Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, p. 6.
650
Ibid., pp. 12, 243.
651
Ibid., p. 32.
652
Ibid., p. 12.
653
Ibid., p. 3.
654
Ibid., p. 36.
655
David Collier, “The Comparative Method: Two Decades of Change,” in Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Erickson, eds., Comparative Political Dynamics (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 19.
656
Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust, p. 37.
657
Ibid., p. 241. 112. Ibid., p. 244.
658
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 40.
659
Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War, p. 5.
660
Ibid., pp. 10-11. In this context Owen cites the emphasis on the need to go “beyond correlations”; see David Dessler, “Beyond Correlations: Toward a Causal Theory of War,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 3 (September 1991), pp. 337-355.
661
Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War, p. 11-12.
662
Ibid.
663
Ibid., p. 20.
664
Ibid., pp. 51-55.
665
Ibid., pp. 55-56.
666
Ibid., pp. 9, 10, 63, 229.
667
Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460.
668
Krepon and Caldwell, eds., The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification, p. 7.
669
Ibid., p. 8.
670
Ibid., p. 13.
671
Ibid., p. 113. We are indebted to Michael Krepon, one of the project leaders, for providing us with a detailed account of the problems encountered in following strictly the requirements of the structured, focused method.
672
Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, pp. 21-22.
673
Ibid., p. 22.
674
Ibid., pp. 21-22.
675
Ibid., chaps. 5, 6, and 7.
676
Ibid., chap. 8.
677
Ibid., p. 303.
678
Ibid., pp. 311-321.
679
Ibid., p. 321.
680
Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, pp. 13-14.
681
Ibid., p. 13.
682
Ibid., pp. 23-26.
683
Ibid., pp. 26-27.
684
Ibid., p. 85.
685
The author also undertook two secondary research objectives that address the question why U.S. counterinsurgency beliefs were incorrect and what their effects were.
686
Shafer, Deadly Paradigms, p. 14. Two other criteria for case selection were that the cases should be “manifestly important and of some duration,” and that they should differ on critical variables. With respect to the latter criterion, Shafer indicates that his aim was to show that explanations based on the other four theories “do not explain continuity across cases, while my focus on policymakers’ insensitivity to variation across cases does.”
687
Ibid., p. 14.
688
Ibid.
689
Ibid.,