Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [54]
Finally, research on recent and contemporary U.S. foreign policy must be sensitive to the likelihood that important data may not be available and cannot be easily retrieved for research purposes, e.g., important discussions among policymakers that take place over the telephone or within internal e-mail and fax facilities—the results of which are not easily acquired by researchers.
The Risk of Over-Intellectualizing the Policy Process
When academic scholars attempt to reconstruct how and why important decisions were made, they tend to assume an orderly and more rational policymaking process than is justified. For example, overly complex and precise formal models may posit decision-making heuristics that are “too clever by half,” or that no individual would actually utilize. Also, scholars sometimes succumb to the common cognitive bias toward univariate explanations—explanations in which there appears to be a single clear and dominating reason for the decision in question. Instead, analysts should be sensitive to the possibility that several considerations motivated the decision.
In fact, presidents and top-level executives often seek multiple payoffs from any decision they take. Leaders known for their sophistication and skill, such as Lyndon B. Johnson, use this strategy to optimize political gains from a particular decision. Disagreements among scholars as to the particular reason for why a certain action was taken often fail to take this factor into account.
Several considerations can enter into a decision in other ways as well. Particularly in a pluralistic political system in which a number of actors participate in policymaking, agreement on what should be done can emerge for different reasons. It is sufficient that members of the policymaking group agree only on what to do without having to agree on why to do it. In some situations, in fact, there may be a tacit agreement among members of the group that not all those who support the decision have to share the same reason or a single reason for doing so. To obtain sufficient consensus on a decision may be difficult for various reasons, and sufficient time and resources may not be available for achieving a completely shared judgment in support of the decision. In any action-oriented group, particularly one that operates under time pressure, it is often enough to agree on what needs to be done. It may not be feasible or wise to debate until everyone agrees not merely on what decision to take but also the precise reasons for doing so.
Assessing the Evidentiary Value of Archival Materials
Scholars doing historical case studies must find ways of assessing the evidentiary value of archival materials that were generated during the policymaking process under examination. Similarly, case analysts making use of historical studies produced by other scholars cannot automatically assume that these investigators properly weighed the evidentiary significance of documents and interviews.
Scholars are not immune from the general tendency to attach particular significance to an item that supports their pre-existing or favored interpretation and, conversely, to downplay the significance of an item that challenges it. As cognitive dissonance theory reminds us, most people operate with a double standard in weighing evidence. They more readily accept new information that is consistent with an existing mind-set and employ a much higher threshold for giving serious consideration to discrepant information that challenges existing policies or preferences.
All good historians, it has been said, are revisionist historians. That is, historians must be prepared to revise existing interpretations when new evidence and compelling new interpretations emerge. Even seemingly definitive explanations are subject to revision.