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Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences - Alexander L. George [55]

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But new information about a case must be properly evaluated, and this task is jeopardized when a scholar is overly impressed with and overinterprets the significance of a new item—e.g., a recently declassified document—that emerges on a controversial or highly politicized subject.

Analytical or political bias on the scholar’s part can lead to distorted interpretation of archival materials. But questionable interpretations can also arise when the analyst fails to grasp the context of specific archival materials. The importance of context in making such interpretations deserves more detailed analysis than can be provided here, so a few observations will have to suffice.

It is useful to regard archival documents as a type of purposeful communication. A useful framework exists for assessing the meaning and evidentiary worth of what is communicated in a document, speech, or interview. In interpreting the meaning and significance of what is said, the analyst should consider who is speaking to whom, for what purpose and under what circumstances.200 The evidentiary worth of what is contained in a document often cannot be reliably determined without addressing these questions. As this framework emphasizes, it is useful to ask what purpose (s) the document was designed to serve. How did it fit into the policymaking process? What was its relation to the stream of other communications and activities—past, present, and future?

It is also important to note the circumstances surrounding the document’s release to the public, and to be sensitive to the possibility that documents will be selectively released to fit the political and personal goals of those officials who control their release. Much of the internal documentation on Soviet decision-making on the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan beginning in 1979, for example, was released by the government of Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the mid-1990s to embarrass the Soviet Communist Party, which was then on trial for its role in the 1991 Soviet coup attempt. Needless to say, the Yeltsin government did not release any comparable documents on its own ill-fated intervention in Chechnya in the mid-1990s.

In studying the outputs of a complex policymaking system, the investigator is well advised to work with a sophisticated model or set of assumptions regarding ways in which different policies are made in that system. For example, which actors and agencies are the most influential in a particular issue area? To whom does the leader turn for critical information and advice on a given type of policy problem? How do status differences and power variables affect the behavior of different advisers and participants in high-level policymaking?

Thus, it is advisable to observe a number of cautions in following the “paper trail” leading to a policy decision. Has a country’s leader tipped his or her hand—at least in the judgment of participants in the process—regarding what he or she will eventually decide? What effect does such a perception—or misperception—have on the views expressed or written by advisers? Are some of the influential policymakers bargaining with each other behind the leader’s back regarding what advice and options to recommend in the hope and expectation that they can resolve their differences and protect their own interests?201 What role did policymakers play in writing their own public speeches and reports, and to what extent do specific rhetorical formulations represent these top officials’ own words rather than those of speech writers and other advisers?

It is well known that those who produce classified policy papers and accounts of decisions often wish to leave behind a self-serving historical record. One scholar who recently spent a year stationed in an office dealing with national security affairs witnessed occasions on which the written, classified record of important decisions taken was deliberately distorted for this and other reasons.202 Diplomatic historian Stephen Pelz reminds us that “many international leaders take pains to disguise their reasoning and

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