China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [132]
26 See Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Legal Reform in ChinaAfter Mao (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999); Pitman Potter, ed., Domestic Law Reforms in Post-MaoChina (Armonk, N.Y. : M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Stanley Lubman, ed., China‘s Legal Reforms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
27 See Murray Scot Tanner, ThePolitics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China: Institutions, Processes, and Democratic Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Michael Dowdle, “The Constitutional Development and Operations of the National People’s Congress,” Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1 (1997): 1-125.
28 See Kevin O’Brien, “Villagers, Elections, and Citizenship in Contemporary China,” Modern China 27 (4) (2001): 407-435; Tianjian Shi, “Village Commi ttee Elections in China: Institutionalist Tactics for Democracy,” World Politics 51(3) (1999): 385-412; Robert Pastor and Qingshan Tan, “The Meaning of China’s Village Elections,” The China Quarterly 162 (2000): 490-512.
29 See David Zweig, “Undemocratic Capitalism: China and the Limits of Economism,” National Interest(Summer 1999): 63-72; Bruce Dickson, “China’s Democratization and the Taiwan Experience,” Asian. Survey 38(4) (1998):349-364.
30 Zhao reportedly said this in a conversation with a longtime friend in July 2004 while still under house arrest in Beijing. Mingpao, January 30, 2005, A4.
31 The “neoauthoritarian development model” was distilled from the successful developmental experience of East Asia’s newly industrializing countries, which grew rapidly after their authoritarian regimes adopted market-friendly policies without opening the political system.
32 For a discussion of a partial reform equilibrium, see Joel Hcllman, “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,” WorldPolitics 50(2) (1998): 203-234.
33 According to the three polls conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1998, 1999, and 2003, party and government officials, tax collectors, law enforcement personnel, SOE executives, and employers in financial institutions were viewed as having gained the most from economic reform, and SOE workers, peasants, migrant laborers, and workers in township and village enterprises were seen as having benefited the least. In a poll of 15,000 in late 2002, 60 percent said that party and government officials had benefited the most. Xu Xinxin, “Zhongguo chengshi jumin dc guanzhu jiaodian yu weilai yuqi” (China Urban Residents’ Main Concerns and Expectations of the Future), in Ru Xin et al., eds., SHLPS 2000, 87; Liang Dong, “Zhongguo dangzheng ganbu ji ganqun guanxi de diaocha fcnxi” (An Investigative Analysis of Chinese Party and Government Officials and Relations Between the Cadres and the Masses,” in Ru Xin et al., eds., SHLPS2004, 35. In a poll of 109 leading academics in 2003, 73 percent said that party and government officials had benefited the most from reforms and 67 percent said workers had benefited the least. Lu Jianhua, ”Zhuanjia yanli de shehui xingshi jiqi qianjing” “Social Situation and Prospects in the Eyes of Experts) in Ru Xin et al., cds., SHLPS 2004, 18.
34 Wu Guoguang wrote a provocative essay, “Gaige de zhongjie yu lishi de jiexu” (The End of Reform and the Continuation of History), Er shi yi shiji (Twenty-first Century) 71 (2002): 4-13.
35 For an analysis of Zhu Rongji’s failed reforms in the late 1990s, see David Zweig, “China’s Stalled ‘Fifth Wave’: Zhu Rongji’s Reform Package of 1998-2000,” Asian Survey 41 (2) (2001): 231-247.
36 Of the respondents, 30 percent were SOE executives and 70 percent were non-SOE executives. Development Research Center of the State Council (DRC), “Qiye jingyingzhe dui jingji tizhi gaige redian wenti de panduan” (Corporate Executives’ Assessment of the Key Issues in the Reform of the Economic System), DRC diaocha yanjiu baogao (DRC Investigative and Research Report) 186 (2002): 4.
37 See Nicholas Lardy, China