China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [131]
11 www.chinanews.com.cn, December 28, 2003.
12 ZGTJZY2000, 139, 144; ZGTJNJ2003, 653, 671, 691.
13 See Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Political System: Challenges of the Twenty-first Century,” The China Journal 45 (2001): 21-35.
14 On a scale of 1-5, with 3 denoting no change compared with the prereform era and 5 denoting “significant improvement,” respondents gave a score of 3.21 on political efficacy, 3.45 on equal treatment, 3.46 on judicial independence, and 3.67 on individual political rights. Xu Xinxin, “2002 nian Zhongguo chengxiang jumin shehui taidu zhiye pingjia yu zeye quxiang diaocha” (A Survey of the Social Sentiments, Evaluation of Occupations, and Employment Preferences of Chinese Urban and Rural Residents in 2002), in Ru Xin et al., eds., SIILPS 2003 (Beijing : Zhongguo shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2003), 122. A survey of urban residents in 1999 found that they felt their political efficacy had decreased significantly compared with the early 1990s. Wenfang Tang, “Political and Social Trends in the Post-Deng Urban China: Crisis or Stability?” TheChina Quarterly168 (2001): 890-909.
15 Li Rui, “Guanyu woguo zhengzhi tizhi gaigc de jianyi,” (Proposals for Reforming China’s Political System), www.sawin.com.cn/doc/FLY/Free/politics.htm.
16 Ibid.
17 The Polity IV Project’s data can be accessed from www.bsos.umd.cidcm/polity.
18 See www.freedomhouse.org.
19 Transparency International’s ratings assigned to China fluctuate within a relatively narrow range—from 4.73 to 2.16 for the 1990s on a 1-10 scale (10 being the least corrupt).
20 international CountryRisk Guide—IRIS III Data Set, available from the PRS Group at www.prsgroup.com.
21 Jeff Huther and Anwar Shah, “Applying a Simple Measure of Good Governance to the Debate on Fiscal Decentralization,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No.1894 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1998).
22 Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3106 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003).
23 On “voice and accountability,” China’s score was -1.38, compared with Angola (-1.39), Belarus (-1.45), Vietnam (-1.36), Saudi Arabia (-1.40), Afghanistan (-1.31), Russia (-0.52), Ukraine (-0.59), India (0.38), and Mexico (0.33). In terms of “regulatory quality,” China’s score was (—0.41). Scores for other countries were: Nicaragua (—0.41), Cambodia (-0.43), Papua New Guinea (-0.44), Egypt (-0.45), Mali (-0.49), India (-0.34), Mexico (0.49), and Russia (-0.30). On “control of corruption,” China got -0.41, compared with Colombia (—0.47), Ethiopia (-0.35), Iran (-0.38), Romania (-0.34), Russia (-0.90), India (-0.25), Brazil (-0.05), and Mexico (-0.19). On “government effectiveness,” China received 0.18, compared with Namibia (0.18), Croatia (0.19), Kuwait (0.16), Mexico (0.15), Russia (-0.40), and India (-0.13). On “political stability,” China got 0.22. On “rule of law,” China received -0.22, compared with Mexico (—0.22), Madagascar (—0.19), Lebanon (-0.27), Russia (-0.78), and India (0.07). Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters III,” 98-114.
24 See Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, eds., The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999); Elizabeth Perry and Mark Selden, eds., Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance (London: Routledge, 2000); Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Xiaoyuan Shang, In Search of Civil Society: Market Reform and Social Change in Contemporary China (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996).
25 See Minxin Pei, “Is China Democratizing?” Foreign Affairs 77(1) (1998): 68-82; Richard Baum, Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Melanie Manion, Retirement of Revolutionaries in China:Public Policies, Social Norms, Private Interests (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Li Cheng and Lynn White, “Elite Transformation and