China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [134]
51 Fifty-six percent of the officials selected economic reform as the most important factor. Qing Lianbin, “Zhongguo dangzheng lingdao ganbu dui 2002-2003 nian shehui xingshi de jiben kanfa,” 136.
52 Yan Sun, Corruption and Marketin Contemporary China(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2004).
53 The most systematic polling data were cited in the annual SHLPS compiled by the CASS.
54 Hu Angang included the amount of rents in various monopolized industries and provided a higher estimate of the costs of corruption (17 percent of GDP). Hu Angang, ed., Zhongguo: Tiaozhan fubai (China: Fighting Against Corruption) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 2001), 61; Minxin Pci used a more conservative estimate that showed the cost of corruption in the late 1990s was about 4-5 percent of GDP. See Minxin Pei, “Will China Become Another Indonesia?” Foreign Policy 116 (1999): 99.
55 He Qinglian, Xiandaihua de xianjing: Dangdai Zhongguo de jingji shehui wenti (The Trap of Modernization: Economicand Social Problems in Contemporary China) (Beijing:Jinri Zhongguo chubanshe, 1998).
56 Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang sounded the alarm that China’s state capacity, mainly its extractive capacity, was declining, in their influential Zhongguo guojia nengli baogao (A Report on the Capacityof the Chinese State) (Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1993). Although government revenues rose steadily after the tax reforms were implemented in 1994, they remain about 30 percent lower than the level in the early 1980s. Also see Minxin Pci, “China’s Governance Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 81 (5) (2002): 96-109; Li Qiang analyzes the erosion of state capacity in his “Jingji zhuanxing yu jigou gaige” (Economic Transition and Institutional Reform), Jingji shehui tizhi bijiao (Comparative Economic and Social Systems) 4 (1998): 30-34.
57 BYTNB 1 (1997): 24-27.
58 See Kenneth Lieberthal, “Introduction: The ‘Fragmented Authoritarianism’ Model and Its Limitations,” in Kenneth Lieberthal and David Lamp-ton, eds., Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 1-30.
59 In August 2002, the Hainan-based Institute for Reform and Developmcnt held a conference on “Transition and Imbalances,” at which some of China’s leading academics voiced their concerns about growing structural imbalances in Chinese society, economy, and polity. The transcripts of the conference arc at www.chinareform.org/cn/cgi-bin/kxwk/Library_Read.asp?type_id=1&text_id=500.
60 For example, income inequality and urban-rural inequality worsened dramatically in the 1990s. A study by the Ministry of Finance shows that the Gini index for income had risen from 0.282 in 1991 to 0.458 in 2000. Research by the CASS shows that in 2002, the ratio of per capita income between urban and rural residents reached 3:1, the highest ever. www.chinanews.com.cn, June 16, 2003; www.chinanews.com.cn, February 25, 2004.
61 Wang Shaoguang, Hu Angang, and Ding Yuanzhu, “Jingji fanrong beihou de shehui buwending” (The Social Instability Behind Economic Prosperity), Zhanlüe yu guanli (Strategy andManagement)3 (2002): 26-33.
62 Sun Liping, “Women zai kaishi miandui yige duanlie de shehui?” (Are We Facing a Split Society?), Zhanlüe yuguanli 2 (2002): 9-15.
63 One press report cited an official figure of 30,000 collective protests in 2000, about 80 per day. The WashingtonPost, January 21, 2001, A1. Also see Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Villagers and Popular Resistance in Contemporary China,” ModernChina 22(1) (1996): 28-61; Thomas Bernstein, “Farmer Discontent and Regime Response,” in Goldman and MacFarquhar, eds., The Paradox of China’s Post-Mao Reforms, 196-219; Anita Chan and Robert Senser, “China’s Troubled Workers,” Foreign Affairs 76(2) (1997): 104-117.
64 See Xueguang Zhou, “Unorganized Interests and Collective Action in Communist China,” American Sociological Review 58(1) (1993): 54—73.
1. Why Transitions Get Trapped
1 See Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social