China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [135]
2 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 62-64.
3 According to the World Bank, Chinese per capita GDP in purchasing power parity terms reached $1,150 in 1987 and $3,617 in 1999.
4 Adam Przcworski et al. argue that the level of economic development is a poor predictor of democratic transition. See Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
5 Guillermo O‘Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
6 Mikhail Gorbachev turned to glasnostin 1986 only after he encountered strong resistance for perestroika.
7 Economic growth in 1986 fell by almost 5 percent from 1985, ZGTJNJ 2002, 53.
8 Steven Solnick used this “bank run” metaphor to analyze the collapse of the political institutions in the former Soviet Union. See Solnick, Stealing the State: Control and Collapse in Soviet Institutions (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999).
9 Many high-ranking officials caught for corruption were superstitious. They typically hired fortune-tellers to forecast their chances of promotion. In a news story on Hunan, the official news agency, Xinhua, reported that all the provincial department heads prosecuted for corruption between 2001 and 2004 had retained fortune-tellers or “masters.” www.xinhuanet.com, July 14, 2004. Shao Daosheng, “Gaoguan fubai yu xinyang weiji” (Corruption by Senior Officials and Crisis of Faith), www.cas.ac.cn/html/Dir/2003/11/11/4484.htm.
10 These confessions were quoted in www.chinareform.org/cn/cirdbbs/ dispbbs.asp?boardID=6&OD=2083; www.chinanews.com.cn, November 14, 2003.
11 According to the data provided by the CCP COD in 2004, 14 percent of the county-level officials were about thirty-five, 13 percent of the officials at the city/prefect level were about forty. www.chinanews.com.cn, May 19, 2004.
12 news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-02/17, February 17, 2004.
13 The most comprehensive review of this literature is Gérard Roland, Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets, and Firms (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).
14 See Mathias Dewatripont and Gérard Roland, “The Virtues of Gradualism and Legitimacy in the Transition to a Market Economy,” The Economic Journal 102 (1992): 291-300; Lawrence Lau, Yingyi Qian, and Gérard Roland, “Reform without Losers: An Interpretation of China’s Dual-Track Approach to Transition,” Journal of Political Economy 108(1) (2000) : 120-143.
15 See Peter Murrell, “What Is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia?” Post-Soviet Affairs 9(2) (1993): 111-140; Gérard Roland, “The Political Economy of Transition” (Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 2001), 7.
16 William Byrd, “The Impact of the Two-Tier Plan/Market System in Chinese Industry,” Journal of Comparative Economics 11(3) (1987): 295-308.
17 Shang-jin Wei, “Gradualism Versus Big Bang: Speed and Sustainability of Reforms,” Canadian Journal of Economics 30(4) (1997): 1234-1247; Mathias Dewatripont and Gérard Roland, “The Design of Reform Packages under Uncertainty,” American Economic Review 85(5) (1995): 1207-1223.
18 See Thomas Wolf, “The Lessons of Limited Market-Oriented Reform,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(4) (1991): 45-58;