China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [136]
19 János Kornai, The Road to a Free Economy: Shiftingfrom, a Socialist System: the Example ofHungary (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990).
20 See David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs, “Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1990): 99-103.
21 See Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “The Transition to a Market Economy: Pitfalls of Partial Reform,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 57(3) (1992): 889-906; Alwyn Young, “The Razor’s Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People’s Republic of China,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 65(4) (2000): 1091-1135.
22 Wu Jinglian, “Zhongguo gaige de huigu yu qianzhan” (A Review of and Forward Look at China’s Reform), Jingjishehui tizhi bijiao 2 (2000): 2.
23 See Lardy, “When Will China’s Financial System Meet China’s Needs?”
24 Bruce Dickson’s study shows that the CCP has been successful in co-opting entrepreneurs. Bruce Dickson, ChinaRed Capitalists: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs,andthe Prospects for Political Change(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
25 Thomas Rawski, “Reforming China’s Economy: What Have We Learned?” The China Journal 41 (1999): 153. Among the most influential studies endorsing China’s approach, see Barry Naughton, GrowingOut of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Nicholas Hope, Dennis Tao Yang, and Mu Yang Li, eds., How Far Across theRiver: Chinese Policy Reform at the Millennium (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003); Lau, Qian, and Roland, “Reform Without Loscrs,” 120-143; Alan Gelb, Gary Jefferson, and Inderjit Singh, “Can Communist Economies Transform Incrementally? The Experience of China,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 86-133. For a sample review of the literature by Chinese economists, see Wu Jinglian, “Zhongguo gaige de huigu yu qianzhan”; Lin Yifu, Cai Fang, and Li Zhou, “Weishemme Zhongguo jingji gaige qudele chenggong?” (Why Is China’s Economic Reform Successful?), Jingji shehui tizhi bijiao 4 (1995): 28-36; Zhao Renwei, “Dui woguo jingji gaige ershinian de ruogan sikao” (Several Thoughts on Twenty Years of Economic Reform in China), Jingji shehui tizhi bijiao 3 (1999): 9-16; Fan Gang, Jianjin gaige de zhengzhi jingjixue fenxi (A Political Economy Analysis of Gradual Reform)(Shanghai: Yuandong chubanshe, 1996).
26 Roland, Transition and Economics.
27 Byrd, “The Impact of the Two-Tier Plan/Market System,” 295-308; Yingyi Qian, “How Reform Worked in China,” in Dani Rodrik, cd., In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives on Economic Growth(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 297-333; Rawski, “Reforming China’s Economy,” 137-156.
28 Lau, Qian, and Roland, “Reform Without Losers.”
29 William Byrd and Qingsong Lin, eds., China’s Rural Industry: Structure, Development, and Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Jianhua Chc and Yingyi Qian, “Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership of Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics113(2) (1998): 467-496; Jianhua Che and Yingyi Qian, “Institutional Environment, Community Government, and Corporate Governance: Understanding China’s Township-Village Enterprises,” Journalof Law,Economicsand Organization14(1) (1998): 1-23; Jean Chun Oi, Rural ChinaTakes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Jean Oi and Andrew Walder, eds., Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).
30 Susan Shirk provides an insightful analysis of how China’s political structure facilitates the making of reform polices in The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). For a discussion of industrial organizational structure and its effects on China’s reform, see Yingyi