China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [147]
24 Yuan and Song, ‘Jianquan tiaokongjiage binggui jingying fangkai,” 44.
25 One researcher claimed that private agents controlled half the procurement market and they had developed cozy ties with SOEs. Li Hongmin, “Liangshi liutong tizhi gaige haixu jinyibu shenhua,” 30.
26 In May 2004, the State Council approved in principle a draft regulation on grain procurement and marketing that would liberalize the market fully, but the details were not made public. www.chinanews.com.cn, May 19, 2004.
27 Mike Peng and Bing Zhang, “Telecom Competition, Post-WTO Style,” The China Business Review 27(3) (2000): 14; DRC, “Zhongguo dianxinye jingzhcng fcnxi” (An Analysis of Competition in China’s Telecom Sector), DRC diaocha yanjiu baogao80 (2003): 11-12; ZGTJZY 2000, 130.
28 www.chinanews.com.cn, January 15, 2004.
29 Institute of Industrial Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (GASS), “Zhongguo zhengfu guanzhi gaigc chutan” (A Preliminary Study of Reforming China’s Regulatory System), Jingji yanjiu cankao76 (1998): 26; Peng and Zhang, “Telecom Competition.”
30 Zhang Weiying and Shcng Hong, “Cong dianxinye kan Zhongguo de fan longduan wenti” (Antimonopoly in China: The Case of Telecom), Gaige 2 (1998): 68.
31 Eric Harwit and Jack Su, “A Telecom Newcomer Challenges the MPT Monopoly,” The China Business Review 23(3) (1996): 22; Zhang and Sheng, “Cong dianxinye kan Zhongguo de fan longduan wenti,” 70.
32 In 1994, a reorganization of MPT separated its telecom business from its postal service. As a result, China Telecom, the national monopoly, was formed, however China Telecom remained as part of MPT. “Chinese Telecoms: Into the Crucible,” Economist 361 (8246) (November 3, 2001), 67.
33 Zhang and Sheng, “Cong dianxinye kan Zhongguo de fan longduan wenti,” 71-73; Lynn Crisanti, “Untangling China’s Datacom Networks,” The ChinaBusiness Review 24(2) (1997): 40.
34 Institute of Industrial Economics, CASS, “Zhongguo zhengfu guanzhi gaige chutan,” 26.
35 Zhang and Sheng, “Cong dianxinye kan Zhongguo de fan longduan wenti,” 71.
36 China Mobile was separated from China Telecom in 1998. The data presented for the paging market are for 1998. Peng and Zhang, “Telecom Competition,” 12.
37 DRC, “Zhongguo dianxinye jingzheng fcnxi,” 12.
38 Peng and Zhang, “Telecom Competition,” 18.
39 Kenneth DeWoskin, “The WTO and the Telecommunications Sector in China,” The China Quarterly167 (2001): 630-654.
40 In 1999, China Telecom (HK) became China Mobile (HK).
41 Tom Holland, “The Perils of Privatization,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 22, 2002, 55.
42 DRC, “Zhongguo dianxinyc jingzhcng fcnxi,” 11.
43 Ibid., 7-8.
44 Li Zhong (with the State Planning Commission), “Woguo dianxin tizhi gaige de huigu yu zhanwang” (A Review and Prospective Look at Reforming China’s Telecom System), Jingji yanjiu cankao 43 (2000): 5.
45 Crisanti, “Untangling China’s Datacom Networks,” 38.
46 Ted Dean, “The Data Communications Market Opens Up,” TheChina Business Review 28 (1) (2001): 22-24.
47 For example, China ranked sixty-third (out of eighty-two countries rated) in terms of competition in the telecom service industry. Its score was 3.41, out of a possible score of 7 (well below the mean score of 4.53). This placed China behind India (4.65, ranked 42), Russia (3.56, 58), Indonesia (4.08, 51), Thailand (4.47, 44), Hungary (4.79, 38), the Czech Republic (4.68, 40), and the Philippines (4.83, 37). China was ahead of Vietnam (2.74, 74), Ukraine (3.14, 67), and Romania (3.22, 66). China scored poorly on “overall infrastructure quality” as well. With a score of 3.41, China was below the mean of 4.2 and ranked 50 (out of eighty-two countries). It was behind Hungary (4.27, 40), the Czech Republic (4.83, 29), and Thailand (4.77, 30), although it was above India (2.83, 64), Russia (3.12, 59), Indonesia (2.75, 66), and the Philippines (2.28, 76). The costs of service were also higher in China. The mean cost of a three-minute local call was US$9.36 (weighted against each country’s per capita