China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [146]
3 OECD, China in the WorldEconomy.
4 Ibid.
5 Thomas P. Lyons, “Feeding Fujian: Grain Production and Trade, 1986-1996,” The China Quarterly 155 (1998): 512-545.
6 See Yuk-shing Cheng and Shu-ki Tsang, “The Changing Grain Marketing System in China,” The China Quarterly 140 (1994): 1080-1104.
7 OECD, China in the WorldEconomy,66.
8 Cheng and Tsang, “The Changing Grain Marketing System.”
9 A poll of 708 peasants in Jiangxi in 1993 showed that only 22 percent preferred the government-mandated quota system. Chen Xin, Zhou Xianhua, and Deng Shengping, “Nongcun zhengce yao luoshi shichang jingji pan youxu” (Implement Agricultural Policy and Look Forward to an Orderly Market Economy), Diaoyan shijie (Investigation and Research Forum), March 25, 1993, 8.
10 Cheng and Tsang, “The Changing Grain Marketing System.”
11 Zhou Zhangyao and Chen Liangbiao, “Cong ‘baoliang fangjia’ dao ‘tijia dinggou,’” (From “Guarantee Quantity but Liberalize Prices” to “Raise Prices and Mandate Procurement”), Gaige (Reform) 5 (1995): 58; Ma Kai, “Ruhe renshi xianxing liangshi gouxiao zhengce” (How to Understand the Current Policies on Purchase and Sale of Grain), Gaige 2 (1996): 11.
12 OECD, Chinainthe World Economy, 63-64.
13 Zhou and Chen, “Cong ‘baoliang fangjia’ dao ‘tijia dinggou,’” 57.
14 Wang Laibao and Fan Weili, “1999 nian liangshi liutong tizhi gaige zong-shu” (A Summary of the Reform of the Grain Procurement System in 1999), Jingji yanjiu cankao 22 (2000): 4-5; DRC, “1999 nian liangmian liutong tizhi gaige” (The Reform of the Procurement Systems for Grain and Cotton in 1999), DRC diaocha yanjiubaogao 11 (2000): 3.
15 DRC, “Mianhua liutong tizhi yanjiu,” 5-10.
16 After 1998, the dual-track pricing system again became a one-track single price system. The SOEs purchased grain directly from peasants at a government-set protected price and sold to consumers at a loss. The losses were made up by the budget. Li Hongmin, “Liangshi liutong tizhi gaigc haixu jinyibu shenhua,” 26-29.
17 In 2001, the government fully liberalized the grain purchase system in the eight provinces that were net consumers of grain; in 2002, liberalization was extended to the provinces in which grain production and consumption were in balance (such as Yunnan, Chongqing, and Guangxi). But the government retained the same monopoly system in grain-producing provinces. Ding Zhengjing, “Liangshi liutong gaige yu nongye zhengcexing jinrong zhineng dingwei” (Reform of the Grain Purchase System and the Definition of the Financial Function of Agricultural Policy), Zhongguo nongye jingji (China Agricultural Economics) 10 (2003): 72.
18 The figure on accumulated losses is from Nanfang zhoumo, August 28, 2003, www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20030828/. In the reform era, the average cycle of shortage and glut was about three to four years, as was the case in 1985-1988, 1989-1993, and 1994-1998. For example, in the 1994-1998 cycle, prices initially rocketed in 1994 but collapsed in 1996. Yuan Yongkang and Song Ze, “Jianquan tiaokong jiage binggui jingying fangkai” (Improve Macro-Control, Unify Prices, and Liberalize Markets), Gaige 2 (1997): 41.
19 In the early 1980s, for example, the government’s commitment to purchase surplus grain from farmers at higher prices caused a glut; budgetary subsidies to grain almost tripled from 1978 to 1984. Cheng and Tsang, “The Changing Grain Marketing System,” 1090.
20 Yuan and Song, “Jianquan tiaokong jiage binggui jingying fangkai,” 43.
21 Li Hongmin, “Liangshi liutong tizhi gaige haixu jinyibu shenhua,” 27.
22 Yuan and Song, “Jianquan tiaokongjiage binggui jingying fangkai,” 46.
23 Li Hongmin, “Liangshi liutong tizhi gaige