China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [149]
61 Hu Shuli, “Zaitan jinrong gaigc burong ciyi” (Once More, Financial Reform Broods No Delay or Doubts), Caijing, July 31, 2003. www.caijing.com.cn.
62 Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution; Man-Kwong Leung and Vincent Wak-Kwong Mok, “Commercialization of Banks in China: Institutional Changes and Effects on Listed Enterprises,” Journal of Contemporary China 9 (23) (2000): 41-52.
63 Gcnevieve Boyreau-Debray, “Financial Intermediation and Growth: Chinese Style,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3027 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003).
64 Aziz and Duenwald, “Growth-Financial Intermediation Nexus in China.”
65 Boyreu-Debray, “Financial Intermediation and Growth.”
66 Justin Lin and Zhou Hao, “Gaige jinrong zhengce he tizhi shi woguo jingji zouru liangxing xunhuan” (Reforming Financial Policy and System to Make China’s Economy Enter a Virtuous Cyclc), Gaige 2 (1993): 97-105.
67 Genevieve Boyreau-Debray and Shang-Jin Wei, “Can China Grow Faster? A Diagnosis on the Fragmentation of the Domestic Capital Market” (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2004).
68 One private conglomerate, Delong Group, successfully bought stakes in four city commercial banks in three provinces in 2002. With 10 to 40 percent of the shares, Delong was able to control management in two city commercial banks. Caijing,March 20, 2003, 39-54.
69 Through the SCBs and other nonprivate banks, the state controlled 90 percent of the banking market (excluding RCCs). Ding Ling and Chen Ping, “Yinhang longduan, xinyong weiji he jinrong gaige” (Banking Monopoly, Credit Crisis, and Financial Reform), Gaige 2 (2000): 90.
70 The Wall Street, Journal, January 15, 2004, C16.
71 TheFinancial Times, January 10, 2004, www.ft.com.
72 Li Xinxin, “Cong dongya jinrong weiji kan woguo de jinrong yinhuan” (A Look at China’s Financial Risks from the Perspective of the East Asian Financial Crisis), Gaige 3 (1998): 32; M. K. Leung, D. Rigby, and T. Young, “Entry of Foreign Banks in the People’s Republic of China: A Survival Analysis,” Applied Economics 35 (2003): 23.
73 James Barth, Rob Koepp, and Zhongfei Zhou, “Disciplining China’s Banks,” The Milken Institute Review6(2) (2004): 88.
74 In 1999, the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank (which invested in Minshcng Bank) paid US$22 million for a 5 percent stake in Bank of Shanghai (previously known as the Shanghai City Cooperative Bank); HSBC paid $65 million for an 8 percent stake in Bank of Shanghai.
75 The Wall StreetJournal, December 30, 2003, B5.
76 Zhou Xiaochuan, “Wenbu tuijin lilu shichanghua gaige” (Steadily Promoting the Reform in the Marketization of Interest Rates), Caijing, January 11, 2004. www.caijing.com.cn.
77 Pei, “The Political Economy of Banking Reforms in China,” 325-326.
78 www.chinanews.com.cn, November 17, 2003. The SCBs’ share of the outstanding loans was calculated from the data released by the government on January 11, 2004; www.chinanews.com.cn. In terms of assets in all financial institutions in 2001, the four SCBs accounted for 65 percent; the joint-stock banks accounted for 12 percent; urban credit cooperative and city commercial banks had 5 percent; and RCCs had 9 percent. Ccm Karacadag, “Financial System Soundness and Reform,” in Tseng and Rodlauer, eds., China Competing in the Global Economy, 153. Foreign banks had only 1 percent of the assets in the financial system in 2001. China BankingOutlook: 2003-2004 (New York: Standard & Poor’s, 2003), 15.
79 Y. C. Richard Wong and M. L. Sonia Wong, “Competition in China’s Domestic Banking Industry,” Cato Journal (Spring/Summer 2001): 31.
80 Yu Liangchun and Ju Yuan, “Longduan yu jingzheng: Zhongguo yinhangye de gaige he fazhan” (Monopoly and Competition: The Reform and Development of China’s Banking Sector), Jingji yanjiu (Economic Research) 8 (1999): 54.
81 Wong and Wong, “Competition in China’s Domestic Banking Industry,” 28.
82 www.chinanews.com.cn,