China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [150]
83 The government reported that, using China’s less stringent three-category classification, the NPL ratio for the SCBs at the end of 2003 was 16.8 percent; the ratio for city commercial banks was 12.8 percent. www.chinanews.com.cn, January 11, 2004.
84 Joel Baglole, “Opening Up Private Banks,” Far Eastern Economic Review September 18, 2003, 49.
85 www.chinanews.com.cn, December 2, 2003.
86 Chen Zhiqiang, “Woguo zhongxia qiyc fazhan ji guoyou shangye yinhang jinrong fuwu zhuangkuang de diaocha” (An Investigation of the Development of Medium and Small-Sized Firms and the Status of Financial Services Provided by State Commercial Banks in China), Gaige 1 (1999): 54.
87 Wong and Wong, “Competition in China’s Domestic Banking Industry,” 32.
88 DRC, “Minying qiye rongzhi xianzhuang diaoyan baogao” (An Investigative and Research Report on the Status of Financing Private Firms), DRC diaocha yanjiu baogao, April 18, 2001, 15.
89 Pei, “The Political Economy of Banking Reforms in China,” 327.
90 DRC, “Minying qiye rongzhi xianzhuang diaoyan baogao,” 8.
91 Boyreau-Debray, “Financial Intermediation and Growth,” 30-31.
92 State Planning Commission, “Jiang Zhc zhongxiao qiye rongzi yu jinrong jigou fazhan diaocha baogao” (An Investigative Report on the Financing of Medium and Small Firms in Jiangsu and Zhejiang and the Development of Financial Institutions), Jingji yanjiu cankao 1662 (2002): 2-17.
93 OECD, China in the World Economy, 242.
94 China Banking Outlook 2003-2004, 6.
95 At the end of 2002, China had 1,215 listed companies, with a market capitalization of 4.27 trillion yuan (almost 40 percent of GDP); the float was only one-third of the total shares, implying a significantly smaller market capitalization. State Planning Commission, “Zhongguo ziben shichang de peiyu he fazhan zhengce yanjiu,” 8-11.
96 Ibid., 5.
97 Ibid., 11.
98 Of the sixty-three banks included in the Fortune Global 500 in 1999, China’s ICBC and BOC were considered the least efficient and profitable. Feng Zongxian, Tan Yi, and Guo Genglong, “Woguo yinhangye guoji jingzhengli fenxi” (An Analysis of the International Competitiveness of China’s Banking Sector), Gaige 4 (2000): 86. On bank profitability, see Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution, 100-115.
99 See Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution, 92-100; Pei, “The Political Economy of Banking Reforms in China,” 335.
100 China Banking Outlook 2003-2004, 32.
101 Xinwenzhoukan,August 4, 2003, www.chinanewsweek.com.cn.
102 Caijing, July 31, 2003, www.caijing.com.cn.
103 “Recapitalization Still Necessary for China’s Banks Despite Lower Impaired Asset Ratio,” China Banking Outlook 2003-2004, 8.
104 David Lague, “The Great Kaiping Bank Robbery,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 30, 2002, 26-29.
105 Xie Ping and Lu Lei, “Zhongguo jinrong fubai yanjiu: Cong dingxing dao dingliang” (Studying Financial Corruption in China: From Qualitative to Quantitative Approach), Bijiao (Comparative Studies) 8 (2003): 15.
106 X. L. Ding, “Systemic Irregularity and Spontancous Property Transformation in the Chinese Financial System,” The ChinaQuarterly 163 (2000): 655-675.
107 Cao Haili, “Liu Jinbao beiqisu” (Liu Jinbao Was Indicted), Caijing, November 29, 2004, 107.
108 Lague, “The Great Kaiping Bank Robbery,” 26-29.
109 The Financial Times, March 15, 2002, www.ft.com.
110 Nanfang dushibao (Southern Metropolitan News), June 26, 2002, www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/ds/20020626/.
111 Caijing, July 31, 2003, www.caijing.com.cn.
112 Xie and Lu, “Zhongguo jinrong fubai yanjiu,” 1-45.
113 Ibid., 15.
114 Xie and Lu report wide variations between regions. Regions with more active private sectors and higher levels of development had lower bribery premiums. For example, the premium for firms was lower in eastern China (1.5 percent) and southern China, but higher in northern China (6.3 percent). The premium for individual farmers was the