China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [30]
The sense that China’s economic reform could not move forward without complementary political reform was widely shared by the ruling elites, especially among those associated with the liberal wing. Hu Qili, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee who was later purged during the Tiananmen crisis in 1989 along with Zhao, said in April 1986 that “economic reform cannot make progress without political and cultural reforms ... We should not cede the ideas of freedom, democracy, and human rights to capitalism.” Wang Zhaoguo, a protégé of Deng, declared, “When we implement the reform of the economic system, we must adopt accompanying reforms targeting some aspects of the political system.” Wan Li, a vice premier known for spearheading the agricultural reform in Anhui in 1979, echoed the same view. Zhao himself was even more blunt in his criticism of the existing system. “Fundamentally speaking,” he said, “we do not have a tradition of the rule of law ... We want discretion but no constraints; China overemphasizes the role of the core leadership; this type of system cannot guarantee stability.”15
Many provincial-level leaders invited by the task force to participate in these discussions expressed similar views on the flaws of the Chinese political system and the necessity of reform. Wen Shizhen, deputy governor of Liaoning, pointed out that the main flaw of the political system was “feudalism and the lack of democracy and rule by law... Democratization should be the principal direction of reform. The focus of the reform should be on the redistribution of the power of the state.” He called for ending the party’s control of all decision making, strengthening the NPC, and making the state administration more efficient. Wang Jiangong, a deputy party secretary of Shanxi, concurred: “The flaws of the current system are the overcentralization of power, the duplication of functions between the party and the state, the lack of rule by law and democracy, and the unscientific management of cadres.” Some also considered political reform as absolutely necessary to push forward economic reform. Xu Shijie, party chief of Guangzhou, said, “Political reform must work in concert with economic reform and promote economic development.” Sheng Shuren, deputy commissioner of the State Economic Commission, believed that the time was ripe for political reform. In his view, without political reform, economic reform could not proceed.16
On the issue of democracy, a consensus emerged among the more liberal officials as well. Wang Jiangong proposed to redistribute power between the party and the state; strengthen the Standing Committee of the NPC; change how the deputies are elected; and institute checks and balances among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches. Xu argued that the key to political reform was “the gradual improvement in democracy and the legal system” and that “the greatest democracy is election.” Liao Bokang, party secretary of Chongqing, agreed: “The mechanism for people to participate in politics is the key measure of a country’s democratization.” He suggested introducing direct popular nominations of candidates for the People’s Congress as one step to democratize political participation. Wen Shizhcn thought that democratization should be the principal direction of political reform and that its focus should be on the redistribution of the power of the state.17
The task force identified six major aspects of political reform: the separation of the party from the state (dangzheng Jenhai); inner-party democracy (dangneiminzhu); decentralization and administrative reforms; personnel system reform; socialist democracy; and legal reform.18 Of these, the task force focused on three: separating the party from the state, establishing inner-party democracy, and the development of socialist democracy.