China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [29]
When we first raised the question of reform we had in mind, among other things, reform of the political structure. Whenever we move a step forward in economic reform, we are made keenly aware of the need to change the political structure. If we fail to do that, we shall be unable to preserve, and build, the gains we have made in the economic reform. The growth of the productive forces will be stunted and our drive for modernization will be impeded.9
Deng was also aware of the risks posed by political reform. He cautioned:
The content of the political reform is still under discussion, because this is a very difficult question. Since every reform measure will involve a wide range of people, have profound repercussions in many areas and affect the interests of countless individuals, we are bound to run into obstacles, so it is important for us to proceed with caution. First of all we have to determine the scope of the political restructuring and decide where to begin. We shall start with one or two reforms and try not to do everything at once, because we don’t want to make a mess of things. In a country as vast and complex as ours, reform is no easy task. We must be very cautious about setting policies and make no decision until we are quite sure it is the right one.10
However, Deng left no doubt that political reform would be narrowly defined and not be allowed to weaken the dominance of the party.
The first objective is to ensure the continuing vitality of the Party and the state ... The second objective of political structural reform is to eliminate burcaucratism and increase efficiency ... The third objective of political reform is to stimulate the initiative of grass-roots units and of workers, peasants and intellectuals ... We must uphold leadership by the Party and never abandon it, but the Party should exercise its leadcrship effectively.11
To be sure, Deng himself also talked about democracy, but his views were colored by his traumatic experience during the Cultural Revolution and by his belief that democracy was an instrument to promote economic development. For example, in December 1978, shortly after he consolidated his power, he said, “During the current period, we especially need to stress democracy because for quite a long period of time in the past, the system of democratic centralism was not really implemented ... There was too little democracy” within the party. He put special emphasis on “economic democracy,” which he defined as decentralization to promote incentives. Politically, democracy has to be institutionalized and written into law, so as to make sure that institutions and laws do not change whenever the leadership changes, or whenever the leaders change their views or shift the focus of their attention. Moreover, in promoting democracy and a legal system, we must concentrate on enacting criminal and civil codes, procedural laws and other necessary laws concerning factories, people’s communes, forests, grasslands and environmental protection, as well as labour laws and a law on investment by foreigners.12
Political Reform: A Liberal Alternative
In retrospect, the most comprehensive and sustained examination of political reform was conducted by a task force set up by Zhao under Deng’s direct orders. Led by Zhao’s trusted aide, Bao Tong, the task force, called “zhongyang zhengzhi tizhi gaige yantao xiaozu bangongshi” (the office of the central small group for studying and discussing the reform of the political system), consisted of mostly young and middle-aged liberal intellectuals and officials. It convened more than thirty seminars on various aspects of political reform from October 1986 to August 1987, including seven attended by Zhao, Hu Qili, Bo Yibo, Tian,Jiyun, and Peng Chong, the five members of the small group.13 At that time, Deng was committed to implementing some form of political reform