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China's Trapped Transition_ The Limits of Developmental Autocracy - Minxin Pei [28]

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the most consistent—and restrictive—views on political reform. He was the first to raise the issue of political reform in a famous speech on August 18, 1980; six years later, Deng’s call for political reform as a means to speed up economic reform led to the most serious and systematic examination of political reform as a strategy by the top Chinese leadership.4 In Deng’s diagnosis, China’s political system had four major flaws: bureaucraticism, overcentralization of power in the CCP’s leaders, lifetime tenure of cadres, and (official) privileges. To deal with bureaucraticism, official privileges, and lifetime tenure, Deng called for some of the party’s routine administrative power to be divested, a younger and more professional generation of officials to be cultivated, and a discipline inspection committee to be established within the party.

Apparently, Deng was most concerned about the dangers of over-centralization of power within the party, as this could lead to another Cultural Revolution. His solution was to introduce constitutional reforms, which he did not specify, and strengthen collective leadership within the party, a prescription he himself failed to follow later.5 But Deng left no doubt about the ultimate objective of political reform. In the same speech, he declared,

The purpose of reforming the system of the Party and state leadership is precisely to maintain and further strengthen Party leadership and discipline, and not to weaken or relax them. In a big country like ours, it is inconceivable that unity of thinking could be achieved among several hundred million people ... In the absence of a Party whose members have a spirit of sacrifice and a high level of political awareness and discipline ... Without such a Party, our country would split up and accomplish nothing.6

Deng’s fear of political chaos that may arise as a result of democracy and his resolve to maintain the party’s supremacy have since then remained the two constant refrains in his—and the CCP’s—views on political reform.

After the success of agricultural decollectivization provided Deng with the momentum he needed to launch further economic reform, he stopped talking about the need for political reform. Deng put political reform on the agenda only in mid-1986 when economic reform in the urban areas, especially in the state-owned sector, encountered resistance. Deng’s numerous speeches on political reform from June to November 1986 revealed his increasing appreciation of the complementary role of political reform in the implementation of his economic reform strategy. His views, however, were remarkably consistent in that his concept of political reform was restricted to efficiency-boosting administrative streamlining because he believed that “China’s fundamental flaw is bureaucraticism.”7 This perspective led Deng to maintain his firm opposition to institutional checks and balances and to the dilution of the CCP’s power. This is clear in his speech in June 1986—the first time Deng mentioned political reform in almost six years. While being briefed on the economic situation, he said:

As it stands, our political structure is not adapted to the current situation. Political restructuring should be included in the reform—indeed, it should be regarded as the hallmark of progress in the reform as a whole. We must streamline the administration, delegate real powers to lower levels and broaden the scope of socialist democracy, so as to bring into play the initiative of the masses and the grass-roots organizations.8

Deng followed up his call for political reform with similar public pronouncements during the September-November 1986 period. In his remarks, Deng expressed his frustrations with the resistance to economic reform coming from within the party and warned that economic reform would fail without accompanying political reform.

Our reform of the economic structure is going smoothly on the whole. Nevertheless, as it proceeds we shall inevitably encounter obstacles. It is true that there are people, both inside and outside our Party, who

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