Covering_ The Hidden Assault on American Civil Rights - Kenji Yoshino [108]
35 As the trial court Shahar, 836 F. Supp. at 867.
36 Bowers also stated Ibid., p. 867.
37 Indeed, in a letter written See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1116 n. 9 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). Judge Tjoflat also noted, “The record in this case supports an inference that the Attorney General withdrew Shahar’s offer of employment because he thought Shahar had ‘set him up’; once ensconced in the Department of Law office, she would use her position to advance a homosexual-rights agenda among her co-employees.” Ibid., p. 1111 n. 1.
38 In the 1996 case Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
39 The Court’s opinion suggested The Court wrote that Amendment 2 “is a status-based enactment divorced from any factual context from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate state interests; it is a classification of persons undertaken for its own sake, something the Equal Protection Clause does not permit.” Ibid., p. 635.
40 The court cited a precedent Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1108 (citing McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936 [11th Cir. 1985]).
41 It observed that Romer was Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110.
42 Bowers’s claim that retaining The court described Bowers’s interest: “When the Attorney General viewed Shahar’s decision to ‘wed’ openly—complete with changing her name—another woman (in a large ‘wedding’) … he saw her acts as having a realistic likelihood to … interfere with the Department’s ability to handle certain kinds of controversial matters … such as claims to same-sex marriage licenses.” Ibid., pp. 1104–5.
43 Bowers’s statement The court noted Bowers’s claim that the “wedding” would “interfere with the Department’s efforts to enforce Georgia’s laws against homosexual sodomy.” Ibid., p. 1105.
44 Georgia’s sodomy statute Official Code of Ga. Ann. § 16-6-2 (2004) (rendered unconstitutional by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 [2003]).
45 Because the statute In Gordon v. State, for instance, the court noted that the statute “applies equally to homosexual and heterosexual intimate relationships.” Gordon v. State, 360 S.E.2d 253, 254 (Ga. 1987).
46 The Supreme Court Shahar v. Bowers, 522 U.S. 1049 (1998).
47 Although he was the runaway James Salzer, “Governor-Hopeful Bowers Admits Decade-Long Affair,” Florida Times-Union, June 6, 1997, p. A1.
48 Bowers confessed Bill Rankin, “Irony in Georgia: Bowers Wins Case, Admits Adultery,” National Law Journal, June 16, 1997, p. A6.
49 As adultery has long been a crime Georgia’s code classifies adultery—defined as a “married person … voluntarily ha[ving] sexual intercourse with a person other than his spouse”—as a misdemeanor. Official Code of Ga. Ann. § 16-6-19 (2004).
50 “Mr. Bowers penalized me” See ABC News, Sex, Drugs, and Consenting Adults: Should People Be Able to Do Whatever They Want?, May 26, 1998; transcript available at http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v98/n389/a07.html.
51 “It’s still awful” Shahar interview.
52 “Had the evidence revealed” Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
53 “Appellant does not merely say” Chaffin v. Frye, 45 Cal. App. 3d 39, 46–47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
54 In reaching a similar result Charpentier v. Charpentier, 536 A.2d 948, 950 (Conn. 1988).
55 A Missouri court of appeals Delong v. Delong, No. WD 52726, 1998 WL 15536, at *12 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1998), rev’d in part sub nom. J.A.D. v. F.J.D., 978 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1998).
56 Applying the same standard Lundin v. Lundin, 563 So. 2d 1273, 1277 (La. Ct.App. 1990).
57 Notice as well why Ibid.
58 In 1974, a New Jersey court In re J. S. & C., 324 A.2d 90, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974), aff’d, 362 A.2d 54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
59 Based on these findings Ibid., p. 97.
60 a Missouri court of appeals J.L.P.(H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Mo. Ct.App. 1982).
61 An Indiana appellate court Marlow v. Marlow, 702 N.E.2d 733, 736 (Ind. Ct.App. 1998).
62 Sex columnist Dan Savage See Dan Savage, “Sunday Lives: Role Reversal,” New York Times Magazine, March 11, 2001, p. 104.
63 As I sat in the Supreme Court