Currency Wars_ The Making of the Next Global Crisis - James Rickards [59]
Of course, the United States also cared about job creation. The 2001 recession had been mild in statistical terms with regard to GDP and industrial output, but the number of unemployed in America spiked up sharply, from 5.6 million people at the end of 2000 to over 8.2 million at the end of 2001. Despite a technical recovery in 2002, the number of unemployed continued to grow and reached over 8.6 million people at the end of 2002. From there, it declined very slowly so that there were still over 7.2 million unemployed at the end of 2005. When the recession of 2007 began, America was still working off this high base of unemployed, and the total number skyrocketed to over 15.6 million unemployed by October 2009. Including those employed part-time but seeking longer hours and those not officially unemployed but desiring a job, the total number of unemployed and underemployed Americans at the end of 2009 stood at over 25 million men and women. Every one of those 25 million Americans has a face, a name and a family. In our statistical age, economists prefer to present this phenomenon in percentage terms, such as 6.0 percent unemployment for year-end 2002 and 9.9 percent for 2009, but reciting the actual numbers of affected persons—more than 25 million—helps to bring home the depths of the employment problem. America desperately needed to create jobs.
For a while, this human tragedy was masked by the easy money policies of Greenspan and Bernanke and the resulting euphoria of credit card spending, rising home prices, rising stock prices and large no-down-payment mortgages for all comers. Although there were some complaints about Chinese currency manipulation and lost American jobs in 2004 and 2005, these complaints were muted by the highly visible but ultimately nonsustainable prosperity of those years resulting from the easy money. When the music stopped abruptly in 2007 and the United States careened into the Panic of 2008, there was no longer a place for Chinese policy makers to hide.
Now U.S. politicians, led most noisily by Senator Charles Schumer, publicly attacked the pegging of the yuan-dollar exchange rate and blamed the Chinese for lost jobs in the United States. A bipartisan group of U.S. senators, including Schumer, wrote a letter to the Bush White House in 2008, stating, “The unfair price advantage that the undervalued [Chinese currency] gives Chinese firms has forced many American companies to declare bankruptcy or even go out of business, harming our workers, families and middle class.” Senator Schumer and his ilk were undaunted by the fact that there is scant evidence to support this linkage between jobs and exchange rates. It seems unlikely that the typical North Carolina furniture maker would be willing to work for the $118 per month made by his Chinese counterpart. Even if the yuan doubled in value, the Chinese furniture maker would earn only the equivalent of $236 per month—still not high enough to make his U.S. counterpart competitive. None of this mattered to the dollar demagogues. In their view, the Chinese currency was clearly to blame and now the Chinese must respond to their demands for revaluation.
The administration of President George W. Bush was well aware of this chorus of complaints but was also attuned to the importance of close relations with China on a number of other issues. China was the largest purchaser of Iranian oil exports and was therefore in a position to influence