Dialogues of Plato - MobileReference [381]
That appears to be true.
But if the lover is not a friend, nor the beloved a friend, nor bothtogether, what are we to say? Whom are we to call friends to one another? Do any remain?
Indeed, Socrates, I cannot find any.
But, O Menexenus! I said, may we not have been altogether wrong in ourconclusions?
I am sure that we have been wrong, Socrates, said Lysis. And he blushed ashe spoke, the words seeming to come from his lips involuntarily, becausehis whole mind was taken up with the argument; there was no mistaking hisattentive look while he was listening.
I was pleased at the interest which was shown by Lysis, and I wanted togive Menexenus a rest, so I turned to him and said, I think, Lysis, thatwhat you say is true, and that, if we had been right, we should never havegone so far wrong; let us proceed no further in this direction (for theroad seems to be getting troublesome), but take the other path into whichwe turned, and see what the poets have to say; for they are to us in amanner the fathers and authors of wisdom, and they speak of friends in nolight or trivial manner, but God himself, as they say, makes them and drawsthem to one another; and this they express, if I am not mistaken, in thefollowing words:--
'God is ever drawing like towards like, and making them acquainted.'
I dare say that you have heard those words.
Yes, he said; I have.
And have you not also met with the treatises of philosophers who say thatlike must love like? they are the people who argue and write about natureand the universe.
Very true, he replied.
And are they right in saying this?
They may be.
Perhaps, I said, about half, or possibly, altogether, right, if theirmeaning were rightly apprehended by us. For the more a bad man has to dowith a bad man, and the more nearly he is brought into contact with him,the more he will be likely to hate him, for he injures him; and injurer andinjured cannot be friends. Is not that true?
Yes, he said.
Then one half of the saying is untrue, if the wicked are like one another?
That is true.
But the real meaning of the saying, as I imagine, is, that the good arelike one another, and friends to one another; and that the bad, as is oftensaid of them, are never at unity with one another or with themselves; forthey are passionate and restless, and anything which is at variance andenmity with itself is not likely to be in union or harmony with any otherthing. Do you not agree?
Yes, I do.
Then, my friend, those who say that the like is friendly to the like meanto intimate, if I rightly apprehend them, that the good only is the friendof the good, and of him only; but that the evil never attains to any realfriendship, either with good or evil. Do you agree?
He nodded assent.
Then now we know how to answer the question 'Who are friends?' for theargument declares 'That the good are friends.'
Yes, he said, that is true.
Yes, I replied; and yet I am not quite satisfied with this answer. Byheaven, and shall I tell you what I suspect? I will. Assuming that like,inasmuch as he is like, is the friend of like, and useful to him--or ratherlet me try another way of putting the matter: Can like do any good or harmto like which he could not do to himself, or suffer anything from his likewhich he would not suffer from himself? And if neither can be of any useto the other, how can they be loved by one another? Can they now?
They cannot.
And can he who is not loved be a friend?
Certainly not.
But say that the like is not the friend of the like in so far as he islike; still the good may be the friend of the good in so far as he is good?
True.
But then again, will not the good, in so far as he is good, be sufficientfor himself? Certainly he will. And he who is sufficient wants nothing--that