Dialogues of Plato - MobileReference [382]
Of course not.
And he who wants nothing will desire nothing?
He will not.
Neither can he love that which he does not desire?
He cannot.
And he who loves not is not a lover or friend?
Clearly not.
What place then is there for friendship, if, when absent, good men have noneed of one another (for even when alone they are sufficient forthemselves), and when present have no use of one another? How can suchpersons ever be induced to value one another?
They cannot.
And friends they cannot be, unless they value one another?
Very true.
But see now, Lysis, whether we are not being deceived in all this--are wenot indeed entirely wrong?
How so? he replied.
Have I not heard some one say, as I just now recollect, that the like isthe greatest enemy of the like, the good of the good?--Yes, and he quotedthe authority of Hesiod, who says:
'Potter quarrels with potter, bard with bard,Beggar with beggar;'
and of all other things he affirmed, in like manner, 'That of necessity themost like are most full of envy, strife, and hatred of one another, and themost unlike, of friendship. For the poor man is compelled to be the friendof the rich, and the weak requires the aid of the strong, and the sick manof the physician; and every one who is ignorant, has to love and court himwho knows.' And indeed he went on to say in grandiloquent language, thatthe idea of friendship existing between similars is not the truth, but thevery reverse of the truth, and that the most opposed are the most friendly;for that everything desires not like but that which is most unlike: forexample, the dry desires the moist, the cold the hot, the bitter the sweet,the sharp the blunt, the void the full, the full the void, and so of allother things; for the opposite is the food of the opposite, whereas likereceives nothing from like. And I thought that he who said this was acharming man, and that he spoke well. What do the rest of you say?
I should say, at first hearing, that he is right, said Menexenus.
Then we are to say that the greatest friendship is of opposites?
Exactly.
Yes, Menexenus; but will not that be a monstrous answer? and will not theall-wise eristics be down upon us in triumph, and ask, fairly enough,whether love is not the very opposite of hate; and what answer shall wemake to them--must we not admit that they speak the truth?
We must.
They will then proceed to ask whether the enemy is the friend of thefriend, or the friend the friend of the enemy?
Neither, he replied.
Well, but is a just man the friend of the unjust, or the temperate of theintemperate, or the good of the bad?
I do not see how that is possible.
And yet, I said, if friendship goes by contraries, the contraries must befriends.
They must.
Then neither like and like nor unlike and unlike are friends.
I suppose not.
And yet there is a further consideration: may not all these notions offriendship be erroneous? but may not that which is neither good nor evilstill in some cases be the friend of the good?
How do you mean? he said.
Why really, I said, the truth is that I do not know; but my head is dizzywith thinking of the argument, and therefore I hazard the conjecture, that'the beautiful is the friend,' as the old proverb says. Beauty iscertainly a soft, smooth, slippery thing, and therefore of a nature whicheasily slips in and permeates our souls. For I affirm that the good is thebeautiful. You will agree to that?
Yes.
This I say from a sort of notion that what is neither good nor evil is thefriend of the beautiful and the good, and I will tell you why I am inclinedto think so: I assume that there are three principles--the good, the bad,and that which is neither good nor bad. You would agree--would you not?
I agree.
And neither is the good the friend of the good, nor the evil of the evil,nor the good of the evil;--these alternatives are excluded by the previousargument; and therefore, if there be such a thing as friendship or love atall, we must infer that what is neither good nor evil must be the friend,either of the good, or of