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Why do you say so? said Menexenus.

I am afraid, I said, that the argument about friendship is false: arguments, like men, are often pretenders.

How do you mean? he asked.

Well, I said; look at the matter in this way: a friend is the friend ofsome one; is he not?

Certainly he is.

And has he a motive and object in being a friend, or has he no motive andobject?

He has a motive and object.

And is the object which makes him a friend, dear to him, or neither dearnor hateful to him?

I do not quite follow you, he said.

I do not wonder at that, I said. But perhaps, if I put the matter inanother way, you will be able to follow me, and my own meaning will beclearer to myself. The sick man, as I was just now saying, is the friendof the physician--is he not?

Yes.

And he is the friend of the physician because of disease, and for the sakeof health?

Yes.

And disease is an evil?

Certainly.

And what of health? I said. Is that good or evil, or neither?

Good, he replied.

And we were saying, I believe, that the body being neither good nor evil,because of disease, that is to say because of evil, is the friend ofmedicine, and medicine is a good: and medicine has entered into thisfriendship for the sake of health, and health is a good.

True.

And is health a friend, or not a friend?

A friend.

And disease is an enemy?

Yes.

Then that which is neither good nor evil is the friend of the good becauseof the evil and hateful, and for the sake of the good and the friend?

Clearly.

Then the friend is a friend for the sake of the friend, and because of theenemy?

That is to be inferred.

Then at this point, my boys, let us take heed, and be on our guard againstdeceptions. I will not again repeat that the friend is the friend of thefriend, and the like of the like, which has been declared by us to be animpossibility; but, in order that this new statement may not delude us, letus attentively examine another point, which I will proceed to explain: Medicine, as we were saying, is a friend, or dear to us for the sake ofhealth?

Yes.

And health is also dear?

Certainly.

And if dear, then dear for the sake of something?

Yes.

And surely this object must also be dear, as is implied in our previousadmissions?

Yes.

And that something dear involves something else dear?

Yes.

But then, proceeding in this way, shall we not arrive at some firstprinciple of friendship or dearness which is not capable of being referredto any other, for the sake of which, as we maintain, all other things aredear, and, having there arrived, we shall stop?

True.

My fear is that all those other things, which, as we say, are dear for thesake of another, are illusions and deceptions only, but where that firstprinciple is, there is the true ideal of friendship. Let me put the matterthus: Suppose the case of a great treasure (this may be a son, who is moreprecious to his father than all his other treasures); would not the father,who values his son above all things, value other things also for the sakeof his son? I mean, for instance, if he knew that his son had drunkhemlock, and the father thought that wine would save him, he would valuethe wine?

He would.

And also the vessel which contains the wine?

Certainly.

But does he therefore value the three measures of wine, or the earthenvessel which contains them, equally with his son? Is not this rather thetrue state of the case? All his anxiety has regard not to the means whichare provided for the sake of an object, but to the object for the sake ofwhich they are provided. And although we may often say that gold andsilver are highly valued by us, that is not the truth; for there is afurther object, whatever it may be, which we value most of all, and for thesake of which gold and all our other possessions are acquired by us. Am Inot right?

Yes, certainly.

And may not the same be said of the friend? That which is only dear to usfor the sake of something else is improperly said to be dear, but the trulydear is