• Choose a category
• All
• Classic-Fiction

That, he said, appears to be true.

And the truly dear or ultimate principle of friendship is not for the sakeof any other or further dear.

True.

Then we have done with the notion that friendship has any further object. May we then infer that the good is the friend?

I think so.

And the good is loved for the sake of the evil? Let me put the case inthis way: Suppose that of the three principles, good, evil, and that whichis neither good nor evil, there remained only the good and the neutral, andthat evil went far away, and in no way affected soul or body, nor ever atall that class of things which, as we say, are neither good nor evil inthemselves;--would the good be of any use, or other than useless to us? For if there were nothing to hurt us any longer, we should have no need ofanything that would do us good. Then would be clearly seen that we did butlove and desire the good because of the evil, and as the remedy of theevil, which was the disease; but if there had been no disease, there wouldhave been no need of a remedy. Is not this the nature of the good--to beloved by us who are placed between the two, because of the evil? but thereis no use in the good for its own sake.

I suppose not.

Then the final principle of friendship, in which all other friendshipsterminated, those, I mean, which are relatively dear and for the sake ofsomething else, is of another and a different nature from them. For theyare called dear because of another dear or friend. But with the truefriend or dear, the case is quite the reverse; for that is proved to bedear because of the hated, and if the hated were away it would be no longerdear.

Very true, he replied: at any rate not if our present view holds good.

But, oh! will you tell me, I said, whether if evil were to perish, weshould hunger any more, or thirst any more, or have any similar desire? Ormay we suppose that hunger will remain while men and animals remain, butnot so as to be hurtful? And the same of thirst and the other desires,--that they will remain, but will not be evil because evil has perished? Orrather shall I say, that to ask what either will be then or will not be isridiculous, for who knows? This we do know, that in our present conditionhunger may injure us, and may also benefit us:--Is not that true?

Yes.

And in like manner thirst or any similar desire may sometimes be a good andsometimes an evil to us, and sometimes neither one nor the other?

To be sure.

But is there any reason why, because evil perishes, that which is not evilshould perish with it?

None.

Then, even if evil perishes, the desires which are neither good nor evilwill remain?

Clearly they will.

And must not a man love that which he desires and affects?

He must.

Then, even if evil perishes, there may still remain some elements of loveor friendship?

Yes.

But not if evil is the cause of friendship: for in that case nothing willbe the friend of any other thing after the destruction of evil; for theeffect cannot remain when the cause is destroyed.

True.

And have we not admitted already that the friend loves something for areason? and at the time of making the admission we were of opinion that theneither good nor evil loves the good because of the evil?

Very true.

But now our view is changed, and we conceive that there must be some othercause of friendship?

I suppose so.

May not the truth be rather, as we were saying just now, that desire is thecause of friendship; for that which desires is dear to that which isdesired at the time of desiring it? and may not the other theory have beenonly a long story about nothing?

Likely enough.

But surely, I said, he who desires, desires that of which he is in want?

Yes.

And that of which he is in want is dear to him?

True.

And he is in want of that of which he is deprived?

Certainly.

Then love, and desire, and friendship would appear to be of the natural orcongenial. Such, Lysis and Menexenus, is the inference.

They assented.

Then if you are friends, you must have natures which are congenial