Downing Street Years - Margaret Thatcher [134]
On Sunday afternoon at Chequers (9 May) our regular meeting reviewed the diplomatic and military scene. We discussed the state of the negotiations and where they might lead. There was also a politically sensitive military matter. Argentine civilian aircraft were flying over our supply lines and doubtless communicating their findings direct to their submarines. We had every right to act to stop this. But could we be sure that if we shot at a civilian aircraft it would turn out to be an Argentine one? The radar characteristics and the typical flight path of an aircraft on surveillance would help to identify those on such reconnaissance missions. But there was an obvious risk that something could go wrong. We also had to consider the possibility of a commando raid against Ascension Island and our forces there — unlikely perhaps, but potentially devastating.
WEEK SEVEN
We now had to stand firm against the pressure for making unacceptable compromises while avoiding the appearance of intransigence. Specific instructions went to Tony Parsons about our position on withdrawal distances, interim administration, the issue of immigration and the acquisition of property during the interim period and to ensure that the Argentinians did not get away with prejudging the issue on sovereignty: that was for the islanders to decide. There were detailed discussions on the constitutional position of a United Nations administration of the islands. Our view was that the UN representative could only administer the law, not change it. If he wished to do so he would have to act through the islands’ Legislative Council. We also continued to press for a United States military guarantee of the security of the islands — but with very limited success. The UN Secretary-General was somewhat taken aback by the firmness of our stance. But Tony Parsons impressed on him the basic facts of the dispute. It was not we who had committed the aggression, though we had made a number of major concessions. Any arrangement which appeared to reward Argentine aggression would simply not be accepted in Britain.
The Argentinians could not be trusted. For example, on the issue of not prejudging sovereignty, their representative said one thing to the Secretary-General while their Foreign minister said quite the opposite in his public statements. Who was to be believed? The information we were receiving from the Americans about the attitude of the Argentine Junta confirmed our worst predictions. They were apparently not able to give way on sovereignty, even if they had wished, because of the political situation in which they now found themselves. This, however, was their problem not ours. My own views at this time were hardening because I was convinced that if anything we had already gone too far in making concessions. My feelings were echoed in the House of Commons. In the debate on Thursday 13 May Conservative back-benchers showed evidence of restlessness about our negotiations. Francis Pym continued to pursue a weaker line than I did and it was not liked.
Al Haig was now in Europe and his absence apparently gave those in the Administration who were favourable to the Argentinians an opportunity to persuade President Reagan that it was we who were being inflexible. President Reagan telephoned me at 6.40 that evening. He had gained the impression that the Argentinians and ourselves were now quite close