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in our negotiating positions. I had to tell him that unfortunately this was not the case. Major obstacles remained. As regards the interim arrangements, Argentina wanted greater Argentine participation than we could accept and there were substantial difficulties about ownership of property and freedom of movement. Secondly, there was the difficulty of South Georgia where our title was completely different and we were in possession. There was the added problem that we just did not know with whom we were really negotiating. The Argentinians were trying to arrange an interim administration which would lead inevitably to Argentine sovereignty. Finally, there was no guarantee that at a later stage they might not invade the islands again.

President Reagan had been talking to the President of Brazil who had been visiting Washington. There was some concern (entirely misplaced) that we were preparing an attack on the Argentine mainland: whether or not such attacks would have made any military sense, we saw from the beginning that they would cause too much political damage to our position to be anything but counter-productive. President Reagan wanted us to hold off military action. I said that Argentina had attacked our ships only yesterday. We could not delay military options simply because of negotiations. The truth was that it was only our military measures which had produced a diplomatic response, highly unsatisfactory as this was.

President Reagan was also concerned that the struggle was being portrayed as one between David and Goliath — in which the United Kingdom was cast as Goliath. I pointed out that this could hardly be true at a distance of 8000 miles. I reminded the President that he would not wish his people to live under the sort of regime offered by the military Junta and also of the length of time that many of the islanders had lived there and the strategic significance of the Falkland Islands if, for example, the Panama Canal were ever closed. I finished by seeking to persuade him — I believe successfully — that he had been misinformed about the Argentinians’ alleged concessions. It was a difficult conversation but on balance probably a useful one. The fact that even our closest ally — and someone who had already proved himself one of my closest political friends — could look at things in this way demonstrated the difficulties we faced.

On the morning of Friday 14 May there were two separate meetings of the War Cabinet. One consisted of a detailed assessment of the military position and options. The other was taken up with the diplomatic situation. We decided to prepare our own terms to put to the Argentinians as an ultimatum and Tony Parsons and Nico Henderson were summoned back from the United States to Chequers to discuss these for the weekend.

Two events that day and the next gave a great boost to my morale. First, there was the welcome I received from the Scottish Conservative Party Conference in Perth — an occasion which, as I have said before, I always enjoyed. In my speech I set out precisely what we were fighting for and why. I also said:

The Government wants a peaceful settlement. But we totally reject a peaceful sell-out.

The Leader of the Liberal Party, David Steel, accused me of ‘jingoism’. How remote politicians can seem at these times of crisis: neither the audience nor the nation would fall into the same trap of characterizing determination to secure justice and the country’s honour in terms like that.

Secondly, I also learned of the successful raid under cover of darkness by our SAS and Special Boat Service men on Pebble Island off the north of West Falkland, destroying all eleven Argentinian aircraft at the air strip. It was a daring venture and a significant, though unheeded, warning to the Argentinians of the professionalism of our forces.

That Sunday at Chequers was mainly spent in drafting our own final proposals, to be put to the Argentinians by the UN Secretary-General. The vital consideration was that we bring the negotiating process to an end — ideally, before the landings — but in